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DISTRIBUTED FEDERALISM:
THE TRANSFORMATION OF YOUNGER
Anne Rachel Traum†
For decades federal courts have remained mostly off limits to civil rights cases challenging the constitutionality of state
criminal proceedings. Younger abstention, which requires federal courts to abstain from suits challenging the constitutionality of pending state prosecutions, has blocked plaintiffs from
bringing meritorious civil rights cases and insulated local officials and federal courts from having to defend against or decide them. Younger’s reach is broad. It has forced political
protestors (from the Vietnam era to Black Lives Matter) to challenge the constitutionality of their arrests and prosecutions
within their state criminal proceedings. The doctrine also has
made it difficult to challenge in federal court the constitutionality of serious, routine, and widespread practices impacting
indigent criminal suspects and defendants. Only recently
have civil rights litigants dared to test Younger. And, lo and
behold, federal courts are pivoting away from Younger abstention, granting relief in some cases, and opening the possibility
that federal courts could become an important venue for criminal justice reform.
This Article argues that courts are rejecting Younger abstention and instead distributing federalism concerns throughout the litigation. This “distributed federalism” approach was
modeled decades ago in Gerstein v. Pugh, which powerfully
showed that by rejecting Younger abstention, federal courts
do not reject federalism. Today federalism is baked into the
civil procedure infrastructure and courts’ reluctance—institutional, doctrinal, and federalism-based––to order injunctive relief against state courts. As litigants get past Younger
abstention, the new battleground will be the degree to which
federalism shapes the scope of constitutional rights and injunctive and declaratory relief. In this new terrain, Younger’s
noninterference principle will transform from an abstention
doctrine to a remedial tool that helps courts justify the manner
and degree of relief that will protect individual rights in state
criminal proceedings.
† Professor of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. Thanks to Fred Smith,
Charlie Gerstein, Richard Fallon, Daryl Levinson, Bret Birdsong, Eve Hanan, and
participants at the Southwest Criminal Law Workshop, including Daniel Epps,
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William S. Boyd School of Law provided financial support for this project.
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INTRODUCTION
For decades, the doors to the federal courthouse were effectively closed to civil suits challenging the constitutionality of
state criminal proceedings. It was common wisdom that federal courts would abstain from hearing such suits under
Younger v. Harris,1 which requires federal courts to dismiss
suits challenging the constitutionality of ongoing state criminal
proceedings. Scholars routinely acknowledged that federal
courts were off limits to such suits and civil rights litigators
stopped bringing them.2 The Court’s stated rationale for
1

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45, 54 (1971).
See Cara H. Drinan, The Third Generation of Indigent Defense Litigation, 33
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 427, 441 & nn.81–86 (2009) (discussing Luckey v.
Miller, 976 F.2d 673 (11th Cir. 1992); citing to Foster v. Kassulke, 898 F.2d 1144
(6th Cir. 1990) (“rejecting inmate’s challenge to Kentucky public defense system”),
Gardner v. Luckey, 500 F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1974) (“rejecting class action challenging Florida public defense system”), and Wallace v. Kern, 499 F.2d 1345 (2d Cir.
1974) (“rejecting class action by inmates to enforce their right to a speedy trial”));
2
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Younger abstention was, in capital letters, “Our Federalism,” a
policy of allowing state courts to redress constitutional challenges without federal interference.3 State criminal defendants
were left to fend for themselves, many without access to counsel, meaningful review, or corrective relief.4 Due to Younger
abstention many allegedly unconstitutional state policies and
practices––including wealth-based detention, shackling, failing
indigent defense services, trial and counsel fees, systemic discovery violations, and discriminatory charging and sentencing
practices––have been extremely difficult to challenge either in a
state criminal case or in a federal civil rights action. While
criticism of Younger was legion, the policy of federal noninterference remained strong for decades, sidelining federal courts
as an important venue for criminal justice reform.5
United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 1532, 1538 (2018) (rejecting as moot
a challenge to the district court’s policy of shackling in full restraints in-custody
defendants during nonjury proceedings); Justin F. Marceau, Challenging the
Habeas Process Rather than the Result, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 85, 188–90 (2012)
(identifying Younger abstention as a significant possible barrier to civil rights suit
challenging the constitutionality of state post-conviction proceedings); Wendy R.
Calaway & Jennifer M. Kinsley, Rethinking Bail Reform, 52 U. RICH. L. REV. 795,
819–22 (2018) (identifying Younger abstention as a significant potential barrier to
civil rights suit challenging constitutionality of state court bail system); Erwin
Chemerinsky, Remarks, Lessons from Gideon, 122 YALE L.J. 2676, 2692–93
(2013) (explaining that Younger abstention and standing pose barriers to a systemic challenge of the adequacy of indigent defense: “A person who is being
prosecuted in state court cannot, because of abstention doctrines, challenge the
adequacy of representation in a federal court action. But a person who is not a
defendant is unlikely to be able to meet the requirements for standing and ripeness.”); Donald H. Zeigler, An Accommodation of the Younger Doctrine and the
Duty of the Federal Courts to Enforce Constitutional Safeguards in the State Criminal Process, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 266, 268–69 (1976) (arguing that in lieu of Younger
abstention federal courts should vindicate the constitutional rights of state criminal defendants while avoiding overly broad interference in state proceedings consistent with the principles underlying Younger).
3
Younger, 401 U.S. at 44.
4
While nearly all defendants charged with felonies are represented by counsel, the rate of representation among defendants charged with misdemeanors is
much less clear. See Erica Hashimoto, The Problem with Misdemeanor Representation, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1019, 1023 nn.13–14, 1024–25 (2013) (observing
that there is no national database on representation in misdemeanor cases and
citing, inter alia, INTER-UNIV. CONSORTIUM FOR POL. & SOC. RESEARCH, SURVEY OF
INMATES IN LOCAL JAILS (2002) (citation appended)); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S.
25, 37 (1972) (extending right to counsel to misdemeanors with risk of actual jail
time); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979) (holding that a defendant
sentenced to a fine had no right to counsel even though crime was punishable by
imprisonment).
5
See, e.g., Fred O. Smith, Jr., Abstention in the Time of Ferguson, 131 HARV.
L. REV. 2283, 2339 (2018) (arguing for a Younger abstention exception for structural or systematic constitutional violations in state criminal proceedings); Owen
M. Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103, 1104–05 (1977) (explaining how Younger
severely limited access to federal courts and injunctive relief); Douglas Laycock,
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Today, fifty years later, Younger is a doctrine in transition.
Younger abstention is under the microscope as civil rights litigants challenge state criminal practices in federal court.6
These lawsuits, often alleged as class actions, have targeted a
range of policies impacting indigent defendants in state court,
especially wealth-based detention.7 Though some of these
suits have been brought in state courts, eschewing abstention
and federalism issues, others have directly confronted the barrier of Younger abstention.8 Today many federal courts are
rejecting Younger abstention, yet they remain extremely cautious about articulating or enforcing rights that will burden
state courts or require federal interference. Plaintiffs who succeed in getting past Younger abstention face new challenges:
getting courts to articulate constitutional rights and securing
enforcement mechanisms that protect individual rights while
minimizing federal interference. Defendants, be they state
court officials, counties, or public defender offices, are navigating new litigations risks, including attorney fees and courtmandated (as well as negotiated) reforms. These results, while
uneven, are shining a light on state criminal proceedings and
forcing a new dialogue on the role of federal courts in enforcing
constitutional rights in state courts.
Federal Interference with State Prosecutions: The Cases Dombrowski Forgot, 46 U.
CHI. L. REV. 636, 642 & n.48 (1979) [hereinafter The Cases Dombrowski Forgot]
(observing that before Dombrowski the Supreme Court frequently reviewed on the
merits suits seeking to enjoin state enforcement of state statutes); Donald H.
Zeigler, Federal Court Reform of State Criminal Justice Systems: A Reassessment
of the Younger Doctrine from a Modern Perspective, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 31, 32
(1985) [hereinafter Federal Court Reform] (arguing that Younger abstention
“should be abandoned”); Douglas Laycock, Federal Interference with State Prosecutions: The Need for Prospective Relief, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 193, 229 (1977) [hereinafter The Need for Prospective Relief] (arguing that a pending state prosecution
should not automatically operate to bar a federal action and urging federal courts
to evaluate the adequacy of state remedies).
6
Organizations filing suits include the American Civil Liberties Union and
the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights, and new players, most significantly,
Equal Justice Under Law and a split-off firm called Civil Rights Corps. See, e.g.,
Rodriguez v. Providence Cmty. Corr., Inc., 155 F. Supp. 3d 758, 761 (M.D. Tenn.
2015) (challenging detention based on court debt enforcement by private probation company); Cain v. City of New Orleans, 186 F. Supp. 3d 536, 550–51 (E.D.
La. 2016), aff’d sub nom, Cain v. White, 937 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 2019) (debtor’s
prison); ODonnell v. Harris County., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1062–64 (S.D. Tex.
2017), aff’d as modified, 882 F.3d 528 (5th Cir. 2018), and aff’d as modified sub
nom, ODonnell v. Harris County., 892 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2018) (pretrial detention); Walker v. City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245, 1251 (11th Cir. 2018) (pretrial
detention).
7
See, e.g., Rodriguez, 155 F. Supp. 3d at 761 (challenging detention based
on court debt enforcement by private probation company).
8
See ODonnell, 892 F.3d at 156–57; Walker, 901 F.3d at 1254–55; Arevalo v.
Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 766–67 (9th Cir. 2018).
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This Article develops the concept of distributed federalism
to theorize this transformation and help frame the challenges
ahead. Distributed federalism accepts that federalism is an
important principle that can be expressed in varying degrees at
different stages of litigation, namely, at the justiciability, merits, or remedial stages. The main worry in Younger was a remedial concern: the Court feared that federal injunctive relief
could disrupt individual prosecutions or lead to federal courts
micromanaging day-to-day operations in state criminal courts.
Younger elevated federalism to a justiciability issue, requiring
federal courts to abstain from hearing valid, important civil
rights claims within the court’s jurisdiction.
Distributed federalism builds on an alternative approach,
initially modeled in Gerstein v. Pugh, in which the Court rejected Younger abstention without rejecting federalism.9 The
Court in Gerstein permitted a class action lawsuit challenging
state pretrial detention and relied on federalism to inform the
scope of the constitutional rights and the remedies. Today,
especially in cases challenging criminal procedure issues,
courts are relying on the Gerstein model of distributed federalism. ODonnell v. Harris County showcases the key features of
this approach: a narrow application of Younger abstention, reliance on federal pleading standards to vet claims and frame the
factual and legal issues, a hearing to evaluate the alleged violations, and a decision on the merits that justifies the relief with
sensitivity to federalism concerns.10 Today the justification for
Younger abstention is substantially weakened: courts are less
willing to rely on a judge-made doctrine to avoid hearing claims
within their jurisdiction, early stage claim vetting is a better
mechanism than abstention for identifying which claims
should proceed, and the prospect of obtaining meaningful relief
in state criminal court is dim. Shifting federalism to the rights
and remedies stages ensures that court decisions are factbased and legally justified.
This Article explores the shift from Younger abstention toward distributed federalism, the doctrinal and practical justifications for the shift, and its significance and limitations for civil
9

Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 108 n.9 (1975).
ODonnell v. Harris County, 227 F. Supp. 3d 706, 734–37 (S.D. Tex. 2016)
(granting in part and denying in part defendants’ motion to dismiss), 251
F.Supp.3d 1052, (S.D. Tex. 2017) (granting after a hearing preliminary injunctive
relief to remedy due process and equal protection violations) , aff’d in part and
reversed in part on appeal, 892 F.3d 147, 156–57 (5th Cir. 2018) (affirming rejection of Younger abstention, narrowing scope of due process claim, and limiting the
scope of injunctive relief).
10
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rights litigation. Part I begins by describing how Younger and
Gerstein offer contrasting approaches to federalism and situates them within a theoretical framework, drawing on Richard
Fallon’s and Daryl Levinson’s work on the linkages between
justiciability, rights, and remedies in constitutional adjudication. Younger abstention converted the possibility of injunctive
relief into a threshold issue that blocked access to federal
courts, immunized state courts from accountability, and
spared federal courts from having to articulate or remedy constitutional violations. Gerstein, in contrast, provided an alternative by articulating a narrow, clear federal right but allowing
states broad flexibility on implementation without federal
interference.
Part II describes how courts today are revisiting Younger
and Gerstein in a changed doctrinal and legal landscape. The
Supreme Court has signaled that Younger abstention is the
exception, not the rule.11 State criminal justice systems are
bigger, harsher, and more rushed, and federal civil litigation
emphasizes early-stage litigation, not trial, as the proving
grounds for most claims. Cases like ODonnell v. Harris County
show how courts that reject Younger abstention are considering federalism concerns at later stages to shape constitutional
rights and injunctive relief.12 As courts revisit the scope of
Younger, appellate courts are closely monitoring results––reversing decisions to abstain and reigning in rights and
remedies that they view as too broad.13 For plaintiffs the victory of getting past Younger abstention must be tempered by
the risk of loss or modest or incomplete relief achieved in federal court.
Part III considers the benefits and challenges of distributed
federalism as litigants test the viability of federal courts as a
venue for criminal justice reform. Having overcome the barrier
of abstention, civil rights groups have scored a major victory in
getting courts to articulate rights and find constitutional violations, particularly on wealth-based detention. But the results
have been mixed: courts have narrowly construed rights, limited injunctive relief so as not to burden or interfere in state
court matters, and warned that claims seeking systemic relief
11

Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 77 (2013).
ODonnell, 227 F. Supp. 3d at 734–37 (S.D. Tex. 2016).
13
Id. at 166–67 (affirming rejection of Younger abstention, but limiting the
scope of injunctive relief); Walker, 901 F.3d at 1254–55, 1272 (affirming rejection
of Younger abstention but reversing limiting right to judicial hearing and reversing
grant of preliminary injunctive relief); Arevalo, 882 F.3d at 766–68 (reversing
district court’s dismissal based on Younger abstention).
12
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would remain barred by Younger. In short, federalism remains
a significant barrier to plaintiffs pursuing similar claims in
federal court. A key battleground is whether federal courts can
structure relief that will vindicate constitutional rights and
withstand appellate scrutiny, either by minimizing federal interference or sufficiently justifying federally mandated reforms.
Litigants also may test whether courts will permit other kinds
of suits historically blocked by Younger: challenges to the adequacy of indigent defense offices and the constitutionality of
statutes enforced against the homeless or political protestors.
Distributed federalism does not forecast particular results but
supports a more transparent dialogue on the role of federal
courts in enforcing constitutional rights, so that courts’ reliance on federalism is explained, justified, and reviewable.
I
YOUNGER AND GERSTEIN: CONTRASTING APPROACHES TO
FEDERALISM

As a new crop of litigants flocks to federal court to challenge the constitutionality of state court criminal procedures,
federal courts are revisiting Younger and Gerstein, two seminal
cases that offer different approaches to claimants seeking injunctive relief in state court. Younger required a federal court
to abstain from hearing a claim that sought to enjoin a pending
state criminal prosecution. While Younger was later expanded
to prohibit injunctive relief in civil matters, this Article focuses
on its application in cases challenging the constitutionality of
criminal proceedings.14 In stark contrast is Gerstein, in which
the Supreme Court held that Younger abstention did not apply
to a procedural challenge to state pretrial detention. Younger
and Gerstein address the same basic question, namely,
whether and to what extent federal courts can order injunctive
relief in state criminal proceedings to correct constitutional
violations. But the cases address different legal issues, yield
different answers, and express a commitment to federalism in
different ways. Courts and scholars understandably distinguish Younger and Gerstein based on the nature of the claim
14
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45, 54 (1971); Aviam Soifer & H.C. Macgill,
The Younger Doctrine: Reconstructing Reconstruction, 55 TEX. L. REV. 1141, 1143
(1977) (arguing that Younger and subsequent cases “seriously undermined” the
role of the federal courts in vindicating individual rights secured by the Reconstruction amendments and postbellum statutory reforms); Barry Friedman, A
Revisionist Theory of Abstention, 88 MICH. L. REV. 530, 540 (1989) (arguing that
Younger and its progeny “appears gradually to have abdicated much federal civil
rights jurisdiction in favor of state court jurisdiction over these cases”).
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and the relief sought.15 While those differences are important,
the more striking feature in these cases is how they express
federalism at different stages of the litigation. Younger elevated
federalism to a threshold issue, causing immediate dismissal of
the entire case. Gerstein, by contrast, considered federalism
later on, informing the scope of rights and remedies.
Professor Richard Fallon’s Equilibrium Thesis is helpful for
situating Younger and Gerstein in theoretical terms.16 As Fallon recognizes, constitutional adjudication generally unfolds in
three stages: first, the court ascertains its jurisdiction; second,
it renders a decision on the merits; and third, it awards a
remedy.17 The Equilibrium Thesis holds that decisions at each
stage––justiciability (stage one), substantive/merits (stage
two), and remedial (stage three)––are substantially interconnected and that courts frequently face a choice about which
doctrine to adjust in order to achieve what they deem acceptable results overall.18 Fallon built on the work of others, particularly Daryl Levinson, who developed the concept of
equilibrium by showing how courts shrink substantive constitutional rights in order to avoid expansive remedies. Nonretroactivity rules provide a classic example, according to Levinson,
in that they allow the Supreme Court to create new rights of
criminal procedure without providing new remedies, thus lowering the costs of complying with the new rights.19 Building on
this commonsense insight, Fallon’s Equilibrium Thesis linked
all three stages––justiciability, merits, and remedies––observing that courts “peek ahead” to later stages and
make adjustments in earlier stages to achieve a balance, or
equilibrium, about what the court deems as acceptable
results.20
15
See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74
VA. L. REV. 1141, 1238–39 (1988) (considering a request to enjoin a criminal
prosecution or the intrusiveness of remedy as “federalist” factors favoring Younger
abstention).
16
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies—
and Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633, 635 n.3, 639–42
(2006) (citing Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 678–79
(1983) (suggesting courts “peek ahead” at the consequences of the remedy when
deciding which claims to uphold on the merits) and Daryl J. Levinson, Rights
Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 889–99 (1999)
(arguing that the cost of enforcement, i.e., the severity or scope of the remedy,
may influence a court’s construction of constitutional rights and its willingness to
find violations)).
17
Id. at 639.
18
Id. at 683–84.
19
Levinson, supra note 16, at 913.
20
Fallon, supra note 16, at 642.

R
R
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The Equilibrium Thesis helps to frame Younger and Gerstein as different expressions of federalism. Younger abstention operates as a justiciability rule (stage one) that reflects
concerns about disruptive federal remedies (stage three).21
Younger abstention functions as an all-or-nothing on/off
switch: either the court abstains, or it hears the case. But
Gerstein reveals an alternative, more fine-tuned approach: the
court rejected abstention (stage one) and arguably relied on
federalism to inform the merits and remedial stages (stages two
and three). In the Gerstein model, federalism operates not as a
switch but as an adjustable dial tuned at each stage. This kind
of distributed federalism has two key features: it distributes
federalism throughout the federal litigation process (at the
pleading, merits, and remedial stages) and incorporates a form
of cooperative federalism that minimizes federal interference in
state criminal proceedings.22
Distributed federalism describes a procedural approach,
not a particular result or viewpoint on the degree to which
federalism should shape constitutional rights and remedies.
Federalism addresses the balance of authority between state
and federal governments, particularly the role of federal courts
in adjudicating matters of importance to state courts or administrations.23 Courts and scholars disagree on the proper balance, which tends to ebb and flow over time, reflecting different
judicial viewpoints and sensitivities about the justification for
injunctive relief or its scope.24 Whereas the Equilibrium Thesis
presumes that courts have in mind certain acceptable results,
distributed federalism recognizes that the existing federal process is a better mechanism for identifying meritorious claims
that may warrant injunctive relief. Distributed federalism relies on courts evaluating claims that challenge the constitutionality of state criminal proceedings the same as any other
claim. If jurisdiction exists and the claim survives dismissal, it
should proceed, and the court can identify and explain any
federalism concerns at the rights and remedies stages.
Whereas abstention reflects a judicial refusal to exercise juris21
Cf. Julie A. Davies, Pullman and Burford Abstention: Clarifying the Roles of
State and Federal Courts in Constitutional Cases, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 23–26
(1986) (arguing that abstention doctrines ebb and flow, reflecting the prevailing
conceptions of federalism and the degree to which federal courts should decide or
remedy constitutional challenges impacting state court adjudication).
22
See Smith, Jr., supra note 5, at 2328–30 (explaining how Younger facilitates a kind of cooperative federalism in which federal courts defer to state court
implementation of constitutional standards).
23
Id.; Davies, supra note 21, at 22.
24
Davies, supra note 21, at 23–26.

R

R
R
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diction over a case within the court’s statutory jurisdiction,
distributed federalism provides a framework for courts to more
straightforwardly and transparently articulate and remedy
constitutional violations without shirking their obligation to
decide cases.25
A. Younger Elevated Federalism to a Threshold Issue
Younger and Gerstein present contrasting visions of how to
operationalize federalism in suits challenging the constitutionality of state criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court in
Younger required federal courts to abstain from hearing suits
seeking to enjoin pending state criminal proceedings. Younger
and its progeny (1) converted a stage-three question about injunctive relief into a quasi-justiciability issue to be resolved at
stage one; (2) created a near-blanket rule against injunctive
relief; and (3) deprived injured plaintiffs of a federal forum to
secure rights and remedies unavailable in criminal court. By
elevating federalism to a threshold issue resulting in dismissal
(stage one), Younger categorically prevented federal courts from
having to decide or remedy constitutional claims (stages two
and three).26
In Younger, the plaintiff, John Harris, had been indicted for
violating the California Criminal Syndicalism Act, which
criminalized activity “effecting any political change.”27 He and
several associates sued in federal court claiming that the state
prosecution should be enjoined because the statute violated
his rights to free speech and press and was overbroad.28 A
three-judge panel in federal district court concluded that the
California statute was void for vagueness and overbreadth in
violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and enjoined the state prosecutor from enforcing the statute.29 The
Supreme Court reversed, requiring the lower court to abstain
so that the state court should try the case “free from interference by federal courts.”30
25
Id. at 23–24; see Sprint Commc’ns. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 77 (2013)
(observing “a federal court’s ‘obligation’ to hear and decide a case is ‘virtually
unflagging.’” (citing Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424
U.S. 800, 817 (1976))).
26
See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44–45, 54 (1971); Middlesex Cty.
Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n., 457 U.S. 423, 432, 437 (1982).
27
Younger, 401 U.S. at 38 n.1.
28
Id. at 38–40.
29
Id. at 37.
30
Id. at 43. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 provides that federal courts “may not grant an
injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by
Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\106-7\CRN703.txt

2021]

unknown

Seq: 11

DISTRIBUTED FEDERALISM

8-DEC-21

17:08

1769

The Court in Younger built on traditional equity factors and
federalism to justify dismissal based on abstention.31 Starting
with equity principles, the Court expressed reluctance to act
when “the moving party has an adequate remedy at law and
will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief.”32
Efficiency and deference to the role of the jury provided additional reasons to avoid “a duplication of legal proceedings . . . where a single suit would be adequate to protect the
rights asserted.”33 But the primary justification was comity,
specifically, the policy of non-interference premised on respect
for state courts, which the Court termed “Our Federalism,”
capitalizing the words for emphasis.34 “Our Federalism,” the
Supreme Court explained, represents “a system in which there
is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both the State and
National Governments,” and a belief that “the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left
free to perform their separate functions in their separate
ways.”35 Local prosecutors, the Court stated, fulfill a vital local
function “of prosecuting offenders against the laws of the State
and must decide when and how this is to be done.”36 That
means leaving local courts and prosecutors to do their jobs
without federal interference.37
The court elevated these two principles—federalism and
equity—by making the basic inquiry for injunctive relief a
threshold issue. When a party in federal court is simultaneously defending a state criminal prosecution, federal courts
“should not act to restrain [the state] criminal prosecution,
effectuate its judgments.” 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2018). Such cases are heard by
three-judge panels. See Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 18 (1972) (relying on
28 U.S.C. § 2284).
31
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 876–77 (7th ed. 2016); James E.
Pfander & Nassim Nazemi, The Anti-Injunction Act and the Problem of Federal–State Jurisdictional Overlap, 92 TEX. L. REV, 1, 59–68 (2013) (arguing that the
Court in Younger justified abstention on equity principles instead of the AntiInjunction Act, which would have supported dismissal).
32
Younger, 401 U.S. at 43–44.
33
Id. at 44.
34
Id. at 43–45.
35
Id. at 44. But see Joshua G. Urquhart, Younger Abstention and Its Aftermath: An Empirical Perspective, 12 NEV. L.J. 1, 22 & nn.150–52 (2011) (describing
scholarly debate on whether state or federal courts are better situated to resolve
constitutional claims challenging state statutes and court proceedings, citing,
inter alia, Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1117–18
(1977); Erwin Chemerinsky, Ending the Parity Debate, 71 B.U. L. REV. 593,
593–94 (1991)).
36
Younger, 401 U.S. at 45 (quoting Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243–44
(1926)).
37
Id.
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when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will
not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief.”38 This
came to be restated in a three-part test requiring Younger abstention when there is (1) “an ongoing state judicial proceeding” (2) that “implicate[s] important state interests” and (3)
offers “adequate opportunity” to “raise constitutional challenges.”39 The Court left open the door to federal court in “extraordinary circumstances”: when there was no “adequate
opportunity” to litigate the issue in state court, when a prosecution was initiated in bad faith, or when the state statute was
“flagrantly and patently” unconstitutional.40 Clearly the
facially invalid statute at issue in Younger failed to satisfy this
new standard. The injuries that Harris faced (risk of conviction, chilled speech, and stigma) were dismissed as “incidental
to every criminal proceeding.”41 Harris could litigate his constitutional claim in the state court proceeding. The Court explained that the “normal thing to do when federal courts are
asked to enjoin pending proceedings in state courts is not to
issue such injunctions.”42 This new “normal,” which strengthened courts’ reluctance to grant injunctive relief, became a new
default rule.
Younger and O’Shea v. Littleton,43 decided three years
later, articulated a “near-blanket rule against injunctions” in
state court proceedings.44 O’Shea v. Littleton continues to cast
a long shadow on the civil rights cases seeking to effectuate
criminal justice reform. The plaintiffs in O’Shea claimed that
local judges intentionally discriminated against African American residents in bond-setting, sentencing, and imposing a fee
for jury trials for some offenses.45 In contrast to Younger, the
plaintiffs in O’Shea were not being prosecuted in state court
and neither challenged the constitutionality of a state statute
38

Id. at 43–44.
Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n., 457 U.S. 423,
432 (1982).
40
Younger, 401 U.S. at 53–54; Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 437. But see Pfander &
Nazemi, supra note 31, at 63 n.366 (citing Fiss, supra note 5, at 1115 (“[T]he
universe of bad-faith-harassment claims . . . is virtually empty.”)); see also
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 31, at 908–09 (noting that bad faith and patently unconstitutional exceptions to Younger have never been applied by the Supreme Court).
41
Younger, 401 U.S. at 47 (citing Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157
(1943)).
42
Id. at 45.
43
O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
44
Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, Equity and Hierarchy: Reflections on
the Harris Execution, 102 YALE L.J. 255, 264 (1992) (arguing that Younger made
federalism “always decisive in favor of the state”).
45
O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 491–92.
39

R
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nor sought to enjoin a prosecution, so the federal court did not
have a specific state court proceeding to defer to.46 The Supreme Court in O’Shea held that the plaintiffs lacked standing
because they were not facing prosecution and could not show
that they would be prosecuted in the future. More significantly, the Court held that “even if” it found standing, Younger
would preclude equitable relief.47 Injunctive relief, the Court
explained, “would contemplate interruption of state proceedings to adjudicate” instances of alleged discrimination,48 and
amount to “nothing less than an ongoing federal audit of state
criminal proceedings which would indirectly accomplish the
kind of interference that Younger v. Harris and related cases
sought to prevent.”49 The prospect of “day-to-day supervision”
of state criminal proceedings, the Court said, would be “intrusive and unworkable.”50
B. Gerstein: A Procedural Approach
Gerstein models a different approach to federalism that
allows federal courts to decide constitutional claims while deferring to state court actors. Gerstein and Younger can be distinguished based on the nature of the claim and relief
requested. In Younger the plaintiff sought to enjoin a state
court prosecution based on an allegedly unconstitutional state
statute,51 whereas in Gerstein the plaintiffs claimed they were
entitled to a probable cause hearing in state court to review
their pretrial detention.52 While those distinctions are impor46

Id. at 492, 497–98 (citing Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 101–02 (1971)).
Id. at 493, 495–99 (explaining on standing that the plaintiffs’ past injuries
were insufficient to support injunctive relief and future injuries were too speculative because none could show that they “will again be arrested for and charged
with violations of the criminal law and will again be subjected to bond proceedings, trial, or sentencing” by these judges). The Court added that a request for
relief from “current, existing custody” would be barred by Preiser v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 475 (1973), and injunctive relief from a pending proceeding would be
barred by Younger. Id. at 496. The Court in O’Shea pointed to procedures in state
court that, at least in theory, could redress racial discrimination by local judges in
criminal cases, including requesting a different judge or change of venue, direct
appeal, post-conviction collateral review, judicial discipline, and “[i]n appropriate
circumstances,” federal habeas relief. Id. at 502. It is not clear that any of these
remedies would have allowed plaintiffs the opportunity to prove and remedy
claims of racial discrimination by state court judges.
48
Id. at 500.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 500–01.
51
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 49 (1971).
52
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 105 (1975); Fallon, supra note 16, at
1238–39 (identifying request to enjoin a state prosecution as a factor favoring
Younger abstention); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 31, at 910–11 (explaining that state
47

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\106-7\CRN703.txt

1772

unknown

Seq: 14

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

8-DEC-21

17:08

[Vol. 106:1759

tant, they fail to capture how Gerstein modeled an approach
that considered federalism at each stage of litigation––as an
abstention question, in deciding the merits, and in fashioning a
remedy. This distributed federalism approach has several
laudable features in that it (1) entrusts federal courts to decide
cases, articulate and adjudicate constitutional claims, and
then carefully craft injunctive relief, (2) shows how federalism
can inform every stage, and (3) exemplifies a preference for
hands-off injunctive relief that relies on state actors to achieve
compliance, leaving open the possibility of more hands-on enforcement and oversight, if needed. Whereas Younger operated
as a blunt instrument of federalism, an on/off switch, Gerstein
shows how federalism can be integrated as an adjustable dial
and highlights how local efforts at policy reform are an important lever for avoiding or justifying injunctive relief.
The plaintiffs in Gerstein had been arrested, charged by
information, and detained in the local jail.53 Having been denied bail, they brought a class action claiming that they were
entitled to a judicial probable cause determination and that
there was no effective way under Florida law to challenge their
continued, indefinite detention.54 Under state law, there was
no procedure, such as a preliminary hearing or habeas corpus,
for defendants to promptly test the probable cause for their
detention.55 Although a statute allowed a preliminary hearing
after thirty days, defendants could be detained at length based
solely on the decision of a prosecutor without any judicial oversight.56 The plaintiffs in Gerstein faced an additional challenge
in that their constitutional claims would be moot as soon as
they were indicted by a grand jury or afforded a judicial
hearing.57
1. Younger Abstention
The Supreme Court in Gerstein adopted the lower courts’
reasoning for rejecting Younger abstention based on the nature
of the claim and requested relief. The Court distinguished
courts will be deemed inadequate under Younger if they provide no available
remedy).
53
Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 105 & n.1. One of the plaintiffs was unable to afford
bail and the other was denied bail based on the seriousness of the charges. Id.
54
Id. at 106–07 (explaining that Florida law provided neither a right to a
prompt preliminary hearing nor a pre-trial habeas remedy so that a person could
be detained for substantial time without any judicial review).
55
Id. at 105–06.
56
Id. at 106.
57
Id. at 105–07.
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Younger in footnote 9, explaining that the plaintiffs’ request for
injunctive relief “was not directed at the state prosecutions as
such,” but instead was directed “only at the legality of pretrial
detention without a judicial hearing, an issue that could not be
raised in defense of the criminal prosecution. The order to hold
preliminary hearings could not prejudice the conduct of the
trial on the merits.”58 This reasoning underscored that the
plaintiffs’ claim was procedural: they merely sought to correct a
procedure within the prosecution, not to enjoin it. Further, the
hearing the plaintiffs sought would not impact the disposition
of the case: it provided neither a substantive defense as in
Younger, nor a dispositive remedy, such as dismissal or suppression, that could prejudice the trial.59 Additionally, the
harm of unjustified pretrial detention amounted to a “significant pretrial restraint on liberty.”60
The plaintiffs in Gerstein alleged a class action and sought
a procedural fix, namely, a post-arrest, judicial probable cause
hearing, tailored to their pretrial detention status.61 This particular claim and remedy were extremely time sensitive because, as the Court recognized, pretrial detention is an
inherently transitory injury that could be mooted by a probable
cause determination, release, or conviction.62 This harm, the
Court explained, fits the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to the mootness doctrine because it was “by its
nature temporary” and “most unlikely” that a plaintiff could
“have his constitutional claim decided on appeal before he is
either released or convicted.”63 The claim could not be addressed after conviction because, as the Court acknowledged,
an “illegal arrest or detention does not void a subsequent con58
Id. at 108 n.9 (citing Conover v. Montemuro, 477 F.2d 1073, 1082 (3d Cir.
1972 [sic]); then comparing to Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971) and Stefanelli
v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951)).
59
See id. at 106–08 & n.9. The Court acknowledged that the temporary
nature of pretrial detention meant that the injury met the “capable of repetition,
yet evading review” exception to the mootness doctrine, so the fact that the named
plaintiffs’ detention had since resolved did not moot the class action. Id. at 110
n.11.
60
Id. at 125 & n.26.
61
Id. at 108. Gerstein also identified the class action as an essential tool for
challenging the “inherently transitory” harms for which “the challenged conduct
was effectively unreviewable because no plaintiff possessed a personal stake in
the suit long enough for litigation to run its course.” Genesis Healthcare Corp. v.
Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 76 (2013).
62
Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 110 n.11 & 119 (acknowledging that the claim could
not be addressed after conviction because an “illegal arrest or detention does not
void a subsequent conviction.”).
63
Id.

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\106-7\CRN703.txt

1774

unknown

Seq: 16

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

8-DEC-21

17:08

[Vol. 106:1759

viction.”64 These features made the injury difficult to redress in
a timely way before conviction and nearly impossible to redress
after conviction.65
Although the Supreme Court’s discussion of Younger abstention was minimal, touching on key distinguishing features,
the lower courts addressed the issue of abstention more fully
by focusing on the practical difficulty of redressing pretrial detention in a state criminal case that offers limited remedies.
Younger did not apply, the district court explained, because the
plaintiffs were not seeking to enjoin a prosecution and instead
merely “pray[ed] for a declaration of procedural rights and an
injunction from the continued denial thereof.”66 Even if
Younger did apply, the court explained, the irreparable harm
exception was satisfied because the plaintiffs’ indefinite pretrial
detention exceeded the ordinary “cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of having to defend against a single criminal
prosecution.”67
The Fifth Circuit rejected Younger for three reasons. First,
the plaintiffs’ claims were not against a “state prosecution as
such” but only against pretrial detention without a judicial
finding of probable cause.68 Second, Younger is not a bar to a
constitutional claim that “cannot be vindicated” in the state
criminal proceeding.69 Comity should bar a federal lawsuit
challenging the constitutionality of a search or seizure, the
court explained, because that claim could be remedied by suppression of evidence in the state criminal case.70 The plaintiffs’
challenge to their pretrial detention, in contrast, could not be
timely vindicated in the state criminal case because there was
no probable cause hearing, other remedies added delay, and
their pretrial detention claim would be mooted by a conviction
or exoneration.71 Finally, the appellate court rejected the notion that plaintiffs could pursue their civil action in state, as
opposed to federal, court, adding that Younger does not “force a
federal court to relinquish jurisdiction over a federal claim
which could not be adjudicated in a single pending or future

64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71

Id. at 110?19.
Id.
Pugh v. Rainwater, 332 F. Supp. 1107, 1111 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
Id.
Pugh v. Rainwater, 483 F.2d 778, 782 (5th Cir. 1973).
Id.
Id. (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)).
Id.

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\106-7\CRN703.txt

2021]

unknown

Seq: 17

DISTRIBUTED FEDERALISM

8-DEC-21

17:08

1775

state proceeding.”72 In other words, the court recognized that
Younger required abstention only if the plaintiff’s claim could
actually be litigated and remedied in their pending state criminal case.73 Having concluded that Younger did not apply, the
appellate court declined to address whether the plaintiffs also
satisfied the irreparable harm exception to Younger
abstention.74
2. Federalism at Every Stage
By rejecting Younger abstention, neither the lower courts
nor the Supreme Court abandoned federalism. To the contrary, these courts considered federalism at every stage of litigation. Had the district court abstained, the plaintiffs’ right to
pretrial detention review might never have been decided precisely because it could not be litigated in a criminal case. By
rejecting Younger and hearing the case, the district court set in
motion a resolution: the lawsuit spurred the defendants to pursue policy change and their eventual failure to adopt constitutionally adequate reforms justified the need for federal
intervention. While the Supreme Court did not explicitly reference federalism in shaping the right to a judicial pretrial detention hearing, it arguably relied on federalism to significantly
trim the right imposed by the lower courts. The federal courts
at every level—district, circuit, and supreme—appear to have
weighed comity in shaping the right to a hearing and fashioning a hands-off remedy.
The failure of local policy reform in Gerstein bolstered the
justification for federal relief. The district court generously allowed time for local officials to adopt policy reforms that could
have obviated the need for federal intervention. The court
delayed ruling on the constitutional claims to allow time for the
Florida Legislature to act, which it failed to do, and then al72
Id.; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 31, at 897 (“[T]here is no doctrine that the
availability or even the pendency of state judicial proceedings excludes the federal
courts.”).
73
Pugh, 483 F.2d at 782. Critics recognize that a court reviewing a civil First
Amendment claim could provide more complete relief than a court would normally
provide in a criminal case. See, e.g., Laycock, The Cases Dombrowski Forgot,
supra note 5, at 667 (explaining that criminal courts the power to grant prospective relief and the power to grant interlocutory relief which are essential to protecting individuals from future prosecutions); see also Smith, Jr., supra note 5, at
2293 (observing that before Dombrowski and Younger federal courts would enjoin
an unlawful state prosecution, discussing Owen M. Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE
L.J. 1103, 1104–05 (1977) and Laycock, The Cases Dombrowski Forgot, 46 U. CHI.
L. REV. 636, 645–59 (1979)).
74
Id. at 782–83.

R

R
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lowed the parties “reasonable time” after a hearing to resolve
the matter on their own.75 The district court then allowed the
county defendants more time to develop a plan to provide preliminary hearings, which the district court mostly adopted.76
The Fifth Circuit stayed the plan pending appeal and upon
learning that the county judges “voluntarily adopted” similar
procedures, remanded the case to the district court to evaluate
the new rules.77 Before the district court ruled, however, the
Florida Supreme Court issued new statewide rules on preliminary hearings, so the district court reviewed those rules instead.78 The federal courts expressed comity by remaining
open to the possibility that these local reform efforts could
resolve the suit, stepping in only after those new procedures
proved constitutionally inadequate.
Although it did not clothe its analysis in the rhetoric of
federalism, the Supreme Court in Gerstein appeared to rely on
federalism principles in shaping the right and the remedy. The
Supreme Court narrowed the scope of the right to a hearing:
while it agreed with the lower courts that the Fourth Amendment requires a timely judicial probable cause hearing for detained individuals, it rejected the right to counsel at the
hearing.79 The Supreme Court crafted a bright-line rule requiring a finding of probable cause by a neutral arbiter (a judge or
grand jury), “someone independent of police and prosecution,”
either in obtaining a warrant or “promptly after arrest.”80 The
hearing could be an informal, ex parte and non-adversarial, the
Court explained, similar to an ex parte hearing used to obtain
an arrest warrant.81 Because of its limited function, the hearing did not need to be adversarial and “is not a ‘critical stage’ in
the prosecution that would require appointed counsel.”82 By
not requiring counsel, the Supreme Court dramatically limited
the scope of the hearing right and the burden it would place on
lower courts.83
A key feature of federalism in Gerstein is that the Supreme
Court crafted a declaratory, hands-off right and remedy that
did not require federal oversight. The Court required a “fair
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83

Pugh v. Rainwater, 332 F. Supp. 1107, 1109 (1971).
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 108 (1975).
Id. at 109.
Id.
Id. at 122–23, 125.
Id. at 114, 118.
Id. at 119–21.
Id. at 122–23.
Id. at 123–25.
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and reliable determination of probable cause . . . before or
promptly after arrest.”84 This standard was more streamlined
than the relief ordered by the district and appellate courts,
which had required a hearing within four days.85 The Court
stated: “There is no single preferred pretrial procedure.”86
“While we limit our holding to the precise requirement of the
Fourth Amendment, we recognize the desirability of flexibility
and experimentation by the States.”87 So while Gerstein boldly
articulated a new right to a probable cause hearing, the scope
of the right—no right to counsel, no timing requirement—appears to have been tempered by federalism, specifically, the
Court’s deference to state courts on implementation and
enforcement.88
C. The Toll of Younger Abstention
Younger abstention exacts a high toll, cutting off the availability of federal courts to articulate and enforce constitutional
rights in state criminal proceedings. Younger abstention is forum-shifting in that it denies plaintiffs the forum and civil remedies they sought in federal court. Though Gerstein offered an
alternative approach tempered by federalism, it failed to gain
traction. Instead, as scholars have recognized for decades,
Younger abstention operated as a federalism-based doctrine of
constitutional avoidance, prompting dismissal of cases challenging the constitutionality of state court criminal proceedings
84
Id. at 125. The district court had also created sanctions in state courts for
non-compliance that the appellate court eliminated “until such time as experience
shows” that the state court actors “are not following” the new rules. Pugh v.
Rainwater, 483 F.2d 778, 790 (5th Cir. 1973).
85
The appellate court trimmed the relief imposed by the district court, which
had also created sanctions for noncompliance. Pugh, 483 F.2d at 790.
86
Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 123.
87
Id. Two decades later the Court required the Gerstein hearing to occur
within forty-eight hours of arrest. County. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S.
44, 56 (1991). Commenters have criticized the forty-eight-hour rule for sanctioning detention without cause. See, e.g., Steven J. Mulroy, “Hold” On: The Remarkably Resilient, Constitutionally Dubious 48-Hour Hold, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 815
(2013), https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1215&context=caselrev [https://perma.cc/8AFB-NU9B] (arguing that the fortyeight-hour hold is “constitutionally problematic” because the prosecution, by circumventing procedural safeguards, can extend the period of detention following
arrest).
88
By connecting the claim to counsel’s performance, a convicted defendant
could grieve the denial of counsel or ineffectiveness of his appointed counsel, a
claim that could be brought post-conviction and potentially undo a conviction.
Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 3, 11 (1970); see also Marceau, supra note 2, at
189–90 (discussing the unlikely possibility that a federal court would entertain a
civil rights suit challenging the constitutionality of state post-conviction
proceedings).
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even when there was no pending criminal case or comparable
remedies in state court. There are many reasons to criticize the
doctrine: it is judicially created, results in the dismissal of
cases within the courts’ statutory jurisdiction, results in underarticulation and underenforcement of civil rights, privileges
unconstitutional conduct by certain state court actors, and
treats plaintiffs facing prosecution worse than less-injured
plaintiffs. Perhaps most importantly, the doctrine seems to be
more about avoidance than parity, one of its stated
justifications.
Younger abstention is forum-shifting: it channels a federal
case into a pending state case (if one exists), and even more
consequentially, converts a civil case into a criminal one.89
Due to standing requirements, Younger favors plaintiffs who
are at risk of, but not actually facing, state prosecution.90 Abstention is not required absent a pending state prosecution
because the risks of duplication, disruption, or lack of respect
do not exist.91 Absent a prosecution, however, standing is a
hurdle because to establish standing a plaintiff must show a
credible threat of enforcement. In Younger, for example, Harris’s injury of actually facing prosecution was sufficient to establish standing but that then triggered abstention.92 Harris’s
fellow activists lacked standing because they were neither facing nor threatened with prosecution.93 They sued too soon (no
standing), whereas Harris sued too late (because his pending
prosecution triggered abstention).94 The ideal federal plaintiff
89
See Fiss, supra note 5, at 1135–36 (1977). Assuming a case proceeds in
federal court, the federal court may not grant declaratory relief if the plaintiff is
the subject of a state criminal prosecution. See Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66,
73 (1971).
90
See Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 2692–93 (2013) (explaining with respect
to enforcing the right to counsel: “A person who is being prosecuted in state court
cannot, because of abstention doctrines [citing Younger], challenge the adequacy
of representation in a federal court action. But a person who is not a defendant is
unlikely to be able to meet their requirements for standing and ripeness.”).
91
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974) (quoting Lake Carriers’ Assn
[sic] v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 509 (1972)); see also Wooley v. Maynard, 430
U.S. 705, 711 (1977) (Younger abstention not required for plaintiffs who did not
seek to undo state convictions and merely sought to block a future prosecution for
violation of the state statute they were challenging in federal court); Doran v.
Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 930–31 (1975) (Younger abstention not required for
when there were no state proceedings pending against the defendants seeking to
challenge the constitutionality of a state statute).
92
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 39–40 (1971).
93
Id. at 41–42.
94
Fiss, supra note 5, at 1118; see also Steffel, 415 U.S. at 463 n.12 (observing that a federal plaintiff not facing prosecution in state court may lack the
standing to proceed on a claim for injunctive relief).
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could show they faced a credible threat of prosecution but had
not yet been prosecuted.
Prosecutors also gained the power to redirect federal litigation back to state court, where they dictate whether and how to
prosecute. In Hicks v. Miranda, the Supreme Court held that
Younger abstention bars a federal suit so long as no “proceedings of substance on the merits have taken place in the federal
court.”95 Hence a prosecutor can “institute state proceedings
in order to defeat federal jurisdiction” by initiating prosecution
in state court after a federal civil rights suit has already been
filed, thus converting the threat of prosecution (necessary for a
plaintiff to establish standing) into a reality (triggering Younger
abstention).96 Younger and Hicks empower prosecutors broad
authority to avoid constitutional litigation in federal court.
This loss of the federal forum has practical and theoretical
significance. As a practical matter, Younger abstention denies
federal plaintiffs the kinds of relief available in a civil rights
action: preliminary injunctive relief, prospective relief, class relief, and attorney’s fees.97 Younger “close[s] the door to federal
injunctive relief” because such relief is simply not available in a
criminal case.98 Preliminary injunctive relief can prevent immediate harm and permanent injunctive relief can lock in policy change and enforcement mechanisms going forward. Class
relief may be necessary to redress challenges to systemic or
policy issues that cannot be presented in a criminal proceeding.99 In a criminal prosecution, pretrial issues such as deten95

422 U.S. 332, 337, 349 (1975).
Id. at 354, 357 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“There is, to be sure, something
unseemly about having the applicability of the Younger doctrine turn solely on the
outcome of a race to the courthouse. The rule the Court adopts today, however,
does not eliminate that race; it merely permits the State to leave the mark later,
run a shorter course, and arrive first at the finish line. This rule seems to me to
result from a failure to evaluate the state and federal interests as of the time the
state prosecution was commenced.”).
97
See also id. (“[C]onsiderations of equity practice and comity in our federal
system . . . have little force in the absence of a pending state proceeding.”).
98
Fiss, supra note 5, at 1118.
99
See, e.g., Drinan, supra note 2, at 441 nn.81–86 (discussing Luckey v.
Miller, 976 F.2d 673 (11th Cir. 1992); citing to Foster v. Kassulke, 898 F.2d 1144
(6th Cir. 1990) (“rejecting inmate’s challenge to Kentucky public defense system”),
Gardner v. Luckey, 500 F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1974) (“rejecting class action challenging Florida public defense system”), and Wallace v. Kern, 499 F.2d 1345 (2d Cir.
1974) (“rejecting class action by inmates to enforce their right to a speedy trial”));
see also United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 1532, 1542 (2018) (rejecting
as moot criminal defendants’ challenge to use of full restraints on pretrial detainees); Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 2687 n.38 (citing Luckey, Foster, Gardner,
and Wallace as “[c]hallenges in federal court to the inadequacy of criminal representation in state courts” that were dismissed on abstention grounds); Marceau,
96
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tion and shackling become moot upon conviction and
nonjusticiable in any forum absent a class action to keep the
controversy alive.100 The possibility of attorney’s fees provides
incentive for counsel to pursue civil lawsuits,101 and because
most criminal defendants are not entitled to appointed counsel,
such access to civil counsel might provide their only shot at
challenging or reforming state criminal practices. And while
plaintiffs ordinarily can choose whether to bring a civil rights
action in federal or state court, the risk of Younger abstention
may force them to sue in state court.102
The idea of parity, which is at the heart of Younger, is that
federal and state courts are equally competent to protect constitutional rights.103 In fact Younger abstention may have little
to do with parity because the federal and the state court are
performing completely different jobs: the plaintiff’s federal case
is civil and the state prosecution is criminal. The Supreme
Court assumed in Younger that the plaintiff had an “adequate
remedy at law” because he could raise his First Amendment
claim as a defense to the state prosecution.104 The Court in
Younger tolerated the chilling effect on speech and minimized
the disadvantages of challenging a statute in criminal court.105
The Court later extended Younger to block suits when there
was no pending criminal prosecution, paying little attention to
supra note 2, at 177–78 (discussing the benefits of class actions brought by
prisoners); Calaway & Kinsley, supra note 2, at 795 (discussing class action
lawsuits and bail reform).
100
Calaway & Kinsley, supra note 2, at 822 n.183–84 (citing Complaint at 2,
Robinson v. Martin, No. 2016-CH-13587 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 14, 2016)); see also
Drinan, supra note 2, at 463 (discussing the indigent defense crisis and offering
solutions); Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 2680 (linking attorney compensation to
the quality of defense counsel and case outcomes); Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. at
1540–42 (holding that defendants’ shackling challenge, asserted in a criminal
case, was mooted by their convictions, but they could challenge the policy in a
civil rights class action).
101
See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b); see Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 751 (1986)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (explaining that “by awarding attorney’s fees Congress
sought to attract competent counsel to represent victims of civil rights
violations”).
102
Hurrell-Harring v. New York, 930 N.E.2d 217, 224–25 (N.Y. 2010) (holding
that state’s failure to provide counsel to indigent defendants in arraignment proceedings violated their Sixth Amendment right to counsel); Wilbur v. City of
Mount Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1124 (W.D. Wash. 2013) (holding that
indigent defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated where “appointment of counsel was . . . little more than a formality”).
103
See Davies, supra note 21, at 27–28 (exploring and critiquing the roles of
state and federal courts in adjudicating federal constitutional issues in cases
susceptible to abstention).
104
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–44 (1971).
105
Id. at 49–51.
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whether the remedy in a state criminal case is “actually adequate.”106 The practical reality is that Younger abstention exacts a high toll, leading either to limited relief or none at all.
Criminal adjudication in state court is a poor substitute for
a federal civil rights action. Criminal adjudication is “atomistic”: it focuses on the fate of a single defendant, based on the
statute as applied to him, and is not designed to “vindicate
quickly and effectively” social rights, including free expression.107 Criminal cases are litigated individually for sound reasons: case by case analysis allows for tailored attention to the
investigation, procedural fairness, guilt adjudication, and individualized sentencing. But, aside from joinder of co-defendants, criminal law contains no mechanism for injunctive relief
or aggregating claims.108 Criminal courts can dismiss a case or
order evidence suppressed or a new trial, but they cannot grant
the kind of prospective injunctive relief that is available in
§ 1983 suits.109 Criminal defendants also face different risks
compared to civil plaintiffs, including detention, the risk of conviction, and reputational harm. Though these aspects of a
criminal case are routine, they can drive the disposition of a
criminal case and contrast sharply with the plaintiff’s rightstesting motive and procedural advantages in a civil case, such
as discovery, burden of proof, and remedies, including attorney’s fees.
Scholars have rightly focused on different ways to redress
the gap in remedies that results from Younger abstention. Professor Laycock, for example, proposed that federal courts remain free to “provide supplemental relief where needed” with
the goal of not disrupting the state court prosecution.110
Under this approach, which could involve a federal court deciding the federal legal issue or staying the federal case until the
state prosecution is resolved, the essential point is that
“Younger’s deference to state courts should be limited to cases
in which the state court has power to grant full relief.”111
Others have criticized the rule that Younger also bars declara106
O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499 (1974); see also Prospective Relief,
supra note 5, at 193–94 (arguing that federal courts should consider the “actual
adequa[cy]” of state remedies before withholding federal relief).
107
Fiss, supra note 5, at 1113.
108
Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation in Criminal Law, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 383,
389–93 (2007).
109
Fiss, supra note 5, at 1118 (explaining that Younger “close[d] the door to
federal injunctive relief”).
110
Prospective Relief, supra note 5, at 194.
111
Id. at 238.
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tory relief, which is nonintrusive, statutorily authorized, and
provides an opportunity to articulate constitutional rights, if
not remedies.112
Though Gerstein provided a pathway for navigating these
issues, it proved elusive. The Supreme Court extended
Younger to cases like O’Shea where there was no pending state
prosecution,113 while suits patterned on Gerstein were rejected.
Two notable examples illustrate the point. In Wallace v. Kern,
the Second Circuit explicitly rejected a challenge based on
“footnote 9 in the Gerstein opinion,”114 and in Luckey v. Miller,
the Eleventh Circuit rejected a federal suit alleging the systemic denial of counsel for indigent defendants even though it
acknowledged the claim presented a “systemic issue[ ] which
cannot be raised in any individual case.”115 The Younger abstention argument in these cases boiled down to a conflict between the strong policy of noninterference (Younger and
O’Shea) and allowing procedural challenges to proceed under
Gerstein because there was no effective remedy in a state criminal proceeding. The courts in Wallace and Luckey abstained
because the courts deemed the possibility of imposing, monitoring, or enforcing constitutional standards in state courts
“intrusive” and “unworkable”116 and feared such relief would
involve the kind of “day-to-day supervision”117 that the Supreme Court “found to be objectionable in O’Shea.”118 Even a
reporting requirement, the court stated in Luckey, “strikes at
the heart of the prohibitions that are embedded into constitutional law by Younger and its progeny.”119
Gerstein also provided a blueprint for noninvasive, mostly
declaratory, injunctive relief that embodies federalism con112
See Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 73 (1971) (extending Younger to suits
seeking declaratory relief); Pfander & Nazemi, supra note 31, at 59–68; see also
Emily Chiang, Reviving the Declaratory Judgment: A New Path to Structural Reform, 63 BUFF. L. REV. 549, 571–75 (2015) (arguing that the declaratory judgment
is a necessary tool in structural reform litigation).
113
Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 77–78 (2013) (citing New
Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 364
(1989)).
114
520 F.2d 400, 406 (2d Cir. 1975).
115
976 F.2d 673, 677–79 (11th Cir. 1992). The Court added that plaintiffs
could have sued in state court, presumably an identical suit under § 1983. See
id. Normally, such a plaintiff could choose whether to bring such a § 1983 suit in
state or federal court.
116
Id. at 676.
117
O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 501 (1974).
118
Wallace, 520 F.2d at 406.
119
976 F.2d at 678 (quoting O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 501) (“[P]eriodic reporting
‘would constitute a form of monitoring of the operation of state court functions
that is antipathetic to established principles of comity.’”).
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cerns. The federal courts in Gerstein modeled this by hearing
the case, delaying proceedings to allow a local solution, deciding the right, and soliciting a workable compliance plan from
local actors. Building in such opportunities for policy reform is
useful for theoretical and practical reasons. As Professor Fred
Smith has argued, Younger facilitates a kind of cooperative
federalism or federal-state partnership in that the Supreme
Court says what the constitution requires and entrusts state
courts to implement and enforce that standard.120 This partnership is tested in a case seeking federal injunctive relief to
ensure that state officials comply with constitutional standards. Practically, allowing state officials to achieve compliance on their own (through policy reform) preserves the federalstate partnership and is an attractive alternative to mandating
injunctive relief. Just as importantly, the failure of local reforms to achieve constitutional compliance may justify federal
interference. In Gerstein, this dynamic played out in stages
over many years. The failure of local reforms justified a new
rule, articulated in broad strokes, that the Fourth Amendment
requires a “fair and reliable” hearing before a neutral judge,
“promptly after arrest.”121 The Supreme Court left the rest to
states without specifying a time limit for the hearing, an enforcement mechanism, or a remedy.122 It took another sixteen
years before the Court required a judicial probable cause hearing within forty-eight hours after a warrantless arrest.123
Professor Smith recently proposed a Younger exception for
civil rights cases alleging systemic or structural constitutional
violations.124 This approach is attractive in that it builds on
Younger’s existing irreparable harm exception and has the potential to capture both procedural and substantive constitutional violations. Smith defines systemic violations to include
those that happen as a result of local “pattern, practice, policy,
or custom,” which relies on the standard for proving official
policy in § 1983 civil rights cases.125 “A structural violation,”
according to Smith, would include those errors that strike at
120
Smith, Jr., supra note 5, at 2328–29 (citing ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC
FEDERALISM 121–50 (2009); Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Essay,
Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1258 (2009)) (explaining how
Younger is “an opinion in the tradition of cooperative federalism”).
121
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 (1975).
122
Id. at 123–25 (“While we limit our holding to the precise requirement of the
Fourth Amendment, we recognize the desirability of flexibility and experimentation by the States.”).
123
County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991).
124
Smith, Jr., supra note 5, at 2324.
125
Id. at 2324, 2343.
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the heart of the procedures’ “reliability, such that the resultant
harm is both presumed and immeasurable.”126 This approach
could guide courts in a broader Younger abstention inquiry and
provide a framework for considering the types of injuries that
qualify as irreparable harms.127 But this proposal also is limited in that it adds to the abstention inquiry instead of simplifying or replacing it. The basic operation of Younger abstention
would remain unchanged in that courts would need to decide,
in the context of an early stage motion to abstain under
Younger, whether the plaintiff has stated a claim for a systemic
or structural constitutional violation. That inquiry could replicate the shortcomings that already exist in a Younger analysis,
in which courts evaluate a claim and possible remedies at the
earliest stage of litigation without the benefit of discovery, a
hearing, or findings on the challenged state court practices.
Finally, it is unclear if systemic or structural harms could be
litigated by individuals (as opposed to a class).
II
THE RISE OF DISTRIBUTED FEDERALISM
The distributed federalism approach rejects abstention as
the primary expression of federalism. It recognizes instead that
while federalism remains a strong force, federal courts should
hear meritorious claims and more transparently address federalism concerns at later stages. In numerous civil rights cases
challenging state criminal procedures,128 federal courts decisively have rejected Younger abstention and instead relied on
Gerstein, allowing the case to proceed in federal court.129 Dis126

Id. at 2324.
Id. at 2324–27.
128
Numerous lawsuits brought by advocacy organizations have challenged
wealth-based policies in state courts, including bail policies, debtor’s prison, and
practices related to private probation. Organizations filing suits include the
American Civil Liberties Union, the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights, and new
players—most significantly, Equal Justice Under Law and a split-off firm called
Civil Rights Corps. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Providence Cmty. Corrs., Inc., 155 F.
Supp. 3d 758, 761–65 (M.D. Tenn. 2015) (challenging detention based on court
debt enforcement by private probation company); Cain v. City of New Orleans, 186
F. Supp. 3d 536, 550–51 (E.D. La. 2016), affirmed sub nom, Cain v. White, 937
F.3d 446, 454 (5th Cir. 2019) (debtor’s prison); ODonnell v. Harris County, 251 F.
Supp. 3d 1052, 1062–64 (S.D. Tex. 2017), aff’d as modified, 882 F.3d 528, 543
(5th Cir. 2018), and aff’d as modified sub nom, ODonnell v. Harris County, 892
F.3d 147, 160 (5th Cir. 2018) (pretrial detention); Walker v. City of Calhoun, Ga.,
901 F.3d 1245, 1251 (11th Cir. 2018) (pretrial detention).
129
ODonnell, 892 F.3d at 156–57 (declining to abstain under Younger because
the adequacy of the state court pretrial detention proceedings was the merits
issue and the relief sought is unavailable in a criminal proceeding); Walker, 901
F.3d at 1254–55 (declining to abstain under Younger because the plaintiff did not
127
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tributed federalism frames Younger abstention as the exception, not the rule, and recognizes that federalism concerns can
be more transparently weighed at every stage of litigation. Distributed federalism envisions Younger as an adjustable dial,
not an on/off switch, that informs federal decisions on important constitutional claims, allowing them to be tested and
proven like others in the regular course of litigation instead of
being compressed into a threshold justiciability determination.
This approach does not yield a particular outcome and litigants
certainly will contest the federalism balance courts strike in
determining the scope and existence of rights and the appropriate relief. But this approach will allow for more informed and
transparent decisions by forcing federal courts to justify how
and why their analysis of rights or remedies is shaped by federalism concerns.
A. A Changed Landscape
Courts today are reexamining Younger abstention in a
changed legal landscape. Younger abstention was predicated
on several core principles including parity, efficiency, comity,
federalism, and traditional equity rules. Parity included the
premise that state courts are equally capable of deciding and
remedying constitutional violations, while comity and federalism supported a reluctance to intervene in essential state functions.130 Central to Younger was the assumption that state
courts provided an adequate forum for defendants to litigate
their constitutional challenges and there was no need for duplicative litigation in federal court addressing the same issue.
The reality is that criminal and civil proceedings are distinct
and provide different kinds of relief. The core premise that a
defendant could get adequate relief in his state criminal case
probably was never accurate and is even less true today.
In the intervening decades, changes on both sides of the
ledger—the state criminal side and the federal civil rights
seek to enjoin any state prosecution and the concerns underlying Younger do not
apply); Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 766–67 (9th Cir. 2018) (declining to
abstain under Younger because the case met the irreparable harm exception);
Ewell v. Toney, 853 F.3d 911, 916–17 (7th Cir. 2017) (declining to abstain under
Younger because the federal case has proceeded to the merits).
130
See Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1131 (1977)
(criticizing the notion that state and federal courts are equally competent to adjudicate constitutional claims); Erwin Chemerinsky, Ending the Parity Debate, 71
B.U. L. REV. 593, 601 n.40 (1991) (citing Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation
of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 110 (1984))
(“arguing that judge-made abstention doctrine violates separation of powers in the
absence of express congressional delegation of authority”).
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side—have eroded the justification for Younger abstention.
First, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that Younger is an
exceptional rule and that a civil rights case is a proper vehicle
for challenging the constitutionality of criminal procedure policies. Second, state criminal justice systems have grown exponentially and in ways that make it unrealistic to assume that
individual defendants have a meaningfully opportunity to litigate constitutional challenges in their state criminal case or
only do so at significant personal risk. Third, the early stage
vetting of federal civil claims, especially in civil rights cases
affecting criminal defendants, obviates the need for Younger
abstention. These doctrinal and practical realities inform how
courts interpret and apply Younger.
1. Doctrinal Changes
Two recent Supreme Court decisions shed light on the
scope and impact of Younger abstention. The Supreme Court’s
2013 decision in Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, which
held that the plaintiffs were not required to assert their constitutional challenge in a pending state utility proceeding, signaled a more cautious approach to Younger abstention.131
Sprint reaffirmed the bedrock rule that a “parallel, pending
state criminal proceeding” is a scenario when “federal courts
must refrain from enjoining the state prosecution.”132 But the
Court cautioned that Younger abstention is “exceptional,” explaining, “our dominant instruction” is that “even in the presence of parallel state proceedings, abstention from the exercise
of federal jurisdiction is the ‘exception, not the rule.’”133 The
Court had used similar language decades earlier, emphasizing
that “Congress, and not the Judiciary, defines the scope of
federal jurisdiction.”134 Justice Scalia, writing for the Court in
NOPSI, wrote that where Congress has conferred jurisdiction,
federal courts “lack the authority to abstain” and “cannot abdicate their authority or duty in any case in favor of another
jurisdiction.”135 Sprint, in a unanimous opinion, made the
point even more forcefully, stating that “a federal court’s ‘obli131

571 U.S. 69, 81–82 (2013).
Id. at 72.
133
Id. at 81–82 (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 236
(1984)).
134
See New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans, 491
U.S. 350, 359 (1989) (citing Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922)).
135
Id. at 358 (quoting Chicot Cnty. v. Sherwood, 148 U.S. 529, 534 (1893)).
132
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gation’ to hear and decide a case is ‘virtually unflagging.’”136
Sprint reaffirmed Younger, but clearly signaled that Younger
applies to specific identified categories “but no further.” Before
Sprint, courts favored Younger abstention.137 Today, courts
rely on Sprint to limit and reject Younger abstention.
The before and after effect of Sprint is striking. Only a few
years ago, courts applied Younger expansively and relied heavily on O’Shea to block procedural challenges. The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Bice v. Louisiana Public Defender Board is a
prime example, reflecting a general hostility to claims seeking
procedural, policy reform.138 The plaintiffs in Bice sought to
suspend collection of a thirty-five-dollar indigent defense fee
imposed on defendants who were found or pled guilty, arguing
that the fee, which was used to fund public defense, discouraged public defenders from seeking to exonerate their clients.139 The court acknowledged that a “successful challenge
to the statutory scheme for funding public defenders” would
delay the plaintiff’s prosecution “until adequate funding is located” because “in the aggregate, the $35 dollar fees constitute
a sufficient percentage” of the indigent defense board’s budget
and suspending the fee would slow the criminal docket.140 Relying on O’Shea, the court held that abstention was required
because “the relief requested ‘would indirectly accomplish the
kind of interference that Younger v. Harris and related cases
sought to prevent.’”141
Since Sprint, the message that abstention is the “exception,
not the rule,” has reverberated in the lower courts.142 Despite
136
571 U.S. at 77 (quoting Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United
States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976)).
137
See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491–92 (1973) (citing Younger’s
federal-state comity principle in holding that federal habeas is state prisoners’
sole remedy for claims that challenge the duration of confinement); Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994) (holding that a plaintiff pursuing federal
damages action challenging the legality of state criminal conviction must prove
the conviction was invalidated).
138
See Bice v. La. Pub. Def. Bd., 677 F.3d 712, 718 (5th Cir. 2012).
139
Id. at 714–16.
140
Id. at 717. “In deciding whether to abstain pursuant to Younger, we must
be practical in assessing the most likely result of granting plaintiff’s requested
relief. See Luckey v. Miller, 976 F.2d 673, 679 (11th Cir.1992 [sic]) (‘This Court is
constrained, therefore, to focus on the likely result of an attempt to enforce an
order of the nature sought here.’).” Id. at 718. The court also found that the
plaintiff, who had not attempted to bring the claim in state court, had not established that the state courts provided an inadequate forum, noting that Louisiana
rules technically did not preclude the claim or remedy he sought. Id. at 719–20.
141
Id. at 717, 720 (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 500 (1974)).
142
Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 82 (2013) (quoting Haw.
Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 236 (1984)).
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Bice, the Fifth Circuit in ODonnell and lower courts within the
circuit have rejected Younger abstention as a bar to civil rights
suits challenging state criminal proceedings.143 ODonnell began its discussion of Younger with a word of caution from
Sprint: “As long as a federal court has jurisdiction over an action, the obligation to hear and decide a case is virtually unflagging.”144 Another district court held that Younger did not bar
the plaintiffs’ challenge to debtor’s prison for failure to pay
court fines and fees.145 The Eleventh Circuit in Walker stated
with reference to Sprint, “[a]bstention . . . has become disfavored in recent Supreme Court decisions.”146 One federal district court observed that Sprint is “a forceful reminder” of
federal courts’ obligation to hear cases within their jurisdiction
and suggested that courts might revisit the scope of Younger
abstention “since Sprint,”147 especially when the plaintiff is not
seeking to enjoin a state prosecution.148 Though Sprint reaffirmed the core holding in Younger, courts have relied on it to
apply Younger narrowly and bolster reliance on Gerstein.
The Supreme Court also recently acknowledged that many
policies impacting criminal defendants cannot be litigated in a
criminal case. The Court made this point in response to a suit
challenging a court’s shackling policy brought by federal criminal defendants, each with a pending criminal case.149 Analogizing to Gerstein and civil class actions, the lower court ruled
on the claim even though the defendant’s cases had resolved.
The Supreme Court rejected the claims as moot, explaining
that in criminal procedure there is neither a mootness exception nor a procedure for aggregating claims: for criminal cases
143
See ODonnell v. Harris County, 227 F. Supp. 3d 706, 734 (S.D. Tex. 2016);
Cain v. City of New Orleans, 186 F. Supp. 3d 536, 550–51 (E.D. La. 2016); Caliste
v. Cantrell, 2017 WL 3686579, at *4 (E.D. La. 2017).
144
ODonnell, 227 F. Supp. 3d at 726 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sprint, 571 U.S. at 77).
145
See Cain, 186 F. Supp. 3d at 550–51 (distinguishing Bice, 677 F.3d at 715),
aff’d on appeal, Cain v. White, 937 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 2019).
146
Walker v. City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245, 1254 (11th Cir. 2018).
147
Holland v. Rosen, 277 F. Supp. 3d 707, 735–36 (D.N.J. 2017) (challenging
a New Jersey law that reformed the administration of pretrial detention in state
court (citing Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d 1148, 1154 (8th Cir. 1981)); ODonnell, 227 F.
Supp. 3d at 734–35; and Rodriguez v. Providence Cmty. Corr., Inc., 155 F. Supp.
3d 758, 765–66 (M.D. Tenn. 2015), not raised on appeal, 895 F.3d 272 (3d Cir.
2018).
148
See Holland, 277 F. Supp. 3d at 737 (“Plaintiffs . . . challenge the procedure
by which the conditions of pre-trial release during that prosecution was decided
and seek an injunction ordering a different procedure.”); Walker, 901 F.3d at 1255
(stating that plaintiff “merely asks for a prompt pretrial determination of a distinct
issue, which will not interfere with subsequent prosecution.”).
149
United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 1532, 1538 (2018).
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there is “no vehicle comparable to . . . [a] collective action,
much less the class action. And we have never permitted criminal defendants to band together to seek prospective relief in
their individual criminal cases on behalf of a class.”150 In other
words, the defendants would need to allege a civil class action
under § 1983—likely one patterned on Gerstein—in order to
challenge a pretrial policy and avoid mootness problems.151
Though Sanchez-Gomez involved criminal defendants in federal
court, it recognizes that criminal defendants must rely on civil
rights suits to challenge certain criminal policies that cannot
be litigated within a criminal case.
2. Contextual Changes in Criminal Justice
Younger was decided at a turning point in criminal justice
history when federal courts charted a more limited role in protecting state criminal defendants. The “criminal procedure
revolution” of the 1960s prompted a swift and lasting backlash
in the courts and in Congress.152 The expansion and subsequent contraction of constitutional criminal rights occurred on
three different tracks. In the decades before Younger, the Warren Court expanded federal constitutional protections in state
criminal proceedings,153 the scope of federal habeas review,
and the availability of civil rights suits against government officials.154 The Burger Court, beginning in 1969, worked to reign
in federal oversight of state criminal enforcement: it halted the
expansion of criminal procedure rights by limiting remedies
like the exclusionary rule, expanded doctrines that reinforced
prosecutorial powers in charging and plea bargaining,155 dra150

Id. at 1539, 1542.
See id. at 1542.
152
See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 2003
(2008) (“As the risk of pro-defendant constitutional rulings grew, so did politicians’ incentives to find ways to evade those rulings.”).
153
See Erwin Chemerinsky & Larry Kramer, Defining the Role of the Federal
Courts, 1990 BYU L. REV. 67, 79 (1990).
154
See e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 486 (1953) (“[H]abeas corpus is
available following . . . refusal to review . . . state habeas corpus proceedings.”);
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 245 (1961) (stating that municipal officials acting
under the color of state law may be sued for damages); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 682 (1978) (noting there is recourse against municipal
officials who violate the federal constitution); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 168
(1908) (discussing the use of habeas corpus to discharge persons from custody).
155
See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364–65 (1978) (holding
that provided charges were supported by probable cause, a prosecutor did not
violate due process by threatening severe charges in order to induce a negotiated
guilty plea).
151
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matically limited habeas review,156 and barred the use of federal civil rights suits to challenge state court convictions.157
Adding to these restrictions, Younger abstention closed off civil
remedies for violations of criminal constitutional rights.158
Over those same decades, the criminal justice system grew
exponentially on every scale except judicial capacity, making it
even less likely that criminal defendants could meaningfully
litigate constitutional claims in state court. Today, state criminal courts, where over ninety-five percent of criminal prosecutions are brought, are busier and harsher with less appellate
oversight.159 The number of justice-involved individuals has
soared.160 Penalties are harsher due to the war on drugs,
three-strikes laws, mandatory minimum sentences, and the
elimination of parole, which all have contributed to more defendants in prison serving longer prison sentences.161 Prison
156
See Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-132, §§ 102–08, 110 Stat. 1214; Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 520 (1982)
(exhaustion); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 636–38 (1993) (standard of
review); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 89–90 (1977) (procedural default).
157
See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973) (explaining that habeas
is the sole remedy for any claim challenging the fact or duration of a prisoner’s
physical imprisonment); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487–88 nn.7–8 (1994)
(noting that a defendant claiming damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment must exhaust state court remedies and show that the
conviction or sentence has been overturned in some way).
158
See Garrett, supra note 108, at 401 n.90 (citing to Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37, 42 (1971)) (“holding that federal courts must abstain from enjoining
pending state prosecutions except in highly extraordinary circumstances”); see,
e.g., Heck, 512 U.S. at 477 (requiring acquittal or vacatur as a precondition to a
non-habeas § 1983 suit challenging a conviction); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409, 431 (1976) (holding that prosecutors are absolutely immune from civil suits
for their work as officers of the court).
159
See Michael J. Graetz, Trusting the Courts: Redressing the State Court
Funding Crisis, 143(3) DAEDALUS 96, 96–98 (2014) (describing chronic budget
challenges impacting state criminal and civil courts);see also Kevin R. Reitz, Demographic Impact Statements, O’Connor’s Warning, and the Mysteries of Prison Release: Topics from a Sentencing Reform Agenda, 61 FLA. L. REV. 683, 684–85
(2009) (observing that ninety-five percent of criminal cases arise and are sentenced in state courtrooms).
160
See Press Release, Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Prison Pol’y Initiative,
Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2020 (Mar. 24, 2020), https://
www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html [https://perma.cc/AQG4-KVQT];
Americans with Criminal Records, THE SENTENCING PROJECT (depicting, inter alia,
the rise in incarceration and the number of Americans with criminal records),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Americanswith-Criminal-Records-Poverty-and-Opportunity-Profile.pdf [https://perma.cc/
D7Y6-2PZC] (last visited Sept. 2, 2021).
161
See Criminal Justice Facts, SENT’G PROJECT, https://www.sentencingpro
ject.org/criminal-justice-facts/ [https://perma.cc/S6M3-8TJD] (last visited
May 8, 2021) (detailing that harsh sentencing laws like mandatory minimums and
cutbacks in parole release keep people in prison for longer periods of time, with
increase in sentence length accounting for nearly half of the 222% growth in the
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populations have ballooned since the 1980s by some 222%.162
Millions more individuals have suffered misdemeanor and felony convictions, been detained, supervised, and/or incarcerated, and have experienced lasting collateral consequences.163
State court dockets have swelled and indigent defenders, long
overburdened, face crushing caseloads. For decades courts
have meted out “assembly line justice” in a “rush, rush” atmosphere.164 With busier courts, overwhelmed counsel, and defendants facing higher stakes, state criminal courts have long
been operating in overdrive.
In today’s massive, overburdened, diverse, and harsh state
criminal justice system, there is very little judicial oversight at
the state or federal level. Only defendants charged with felonies or facing jail time have a right to counsel, so millions of
defendants are unrepresented in criminal court each year.165
Nearly all defendants plead guilty, many simply to get released
from jail.166 The Supreme Court has acknowledged that in our
state prison population between 1980 and 2010 and one in nine people in prison
now serving a life sentence, nearly a third of whom are sentenced to life without
parole).
162
Id.
163
See Megan Stevenson & Sandra Mayson, The Scale of Misdemeanor Justice, 98 B.U. L. REV. 731, 737 (2018).
164
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 35, 58 (1972); see, e.g., Scott v. Illinois,
440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979) (adopting “actual imprisonment as the line defining the
constitutional right to appointment of counsel”).
165
See Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 40 (holding that right to counsel applies when
a person is charged with a felony or a misdemeanor with an actual risk of jail
time); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1320–21
(2012) (stating that with an estimated 10.5 million prosecutions annually, misdemeanors constitute approximately eighty percent of state criminal dockets, excluding traffic cases). See, e.g., ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME:
HOW OUR MASSIVE MISDEMEANOR SYSTEM TRAPS THE INNOCENT AND MAKES AMERICA
MORE UNEQUAL 2 (2018) (explaining how eighty percent of criminal offenses
roughly thirteen million per year are for misdemeanors, which typically are
processed without defense counsel, regard for legal rules, or examination of guilt);
Alexandra Natapoff, The Penal Pyramid, in THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING
78–79 (Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff eds., 2017) (describing criminal
adjudication for defendants charged with low-level misdemeanors as rushed and
informal, with little regard for legal standards and rules or actual guilt or innocence); Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in
the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 293–97 (2011) (discussing
the lack of zealous representation of impoverished individuals charged with
misdemeanors).
166
See, e.g., Andrew Manuel Crespo, Systemic Facts: Toward Institutional
Awareness in Criminal Courts, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2050, 2086 & n.154 (2016)
(observing that more than ninety-five percent of defendants plead guilty and the
“plea bargaining process, which, as scholars frequently lament, is not only troublingly coercive, but is also largely insulated from judicial review, despite mounting
evidence that the process contributes significantly to massive and racially disproportionate incarceration rates” (citing inter alia, Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134,
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“system of pleas,”167 defendants at every level are under extreme pressure to plead guilty, and those who choose to litigate
issues or proceed to trial do so at their peril.168 While negotiated guilty pleas have been the dominant mode of conviction
for a century, guilty plea rates have climbed steadily higher.169
Before the 1960s, one-quarter to one-third of state felony
charges led to a trial, compared to just five percent today.170
The percentage of criminal defendants who appeal their felony
convictions is extremely low—less than four percent—while the
number seeking state or federal postconviction review is a
smaller fraction and the rate of appeals for misdemeanors is
infinitesimal.171 As a practical matter, postconviction remedies—which can take years to litigate—are only practical for
defendants suffering lengthy prison sentences.172
The reality today is that the opportunities for most criminal
defendants to litigate constitutional challenges in state court
are slim to nonexistent. Certain remedies are simply unavailable in criminal proceedings and never were. Other remedies for
constitutional violations may exist in theory or on paper but
are impractical due to the delay or personal risk at stake. The
pressures on the system, courts, defense counsel, and individual defendants make it even more difficult and risky for individuals to effectively vindicate their rights within their criminal
cases. These realities dim the prospect of a state criminal defendant finding an “adequate remedy” for a constitutional vio143 (2012); quoting Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as
Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992) (observing “plea bargaining . . . is not
some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system.”))).
167
Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012); Frye, 566 U.S. at 143.
168
See Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Sentencing Shift Gives New Leverage to Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 25, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/26/us/
tough-sentences-help-prosecutors-push-for-plea-bargains.html [https://
perma.cc/7SNZ-UVSQ].
169
See George Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 902 fig.3
(2000).
170
See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 32 n.56
(2011); see also Emily Yoffe, Innocence is Irrelevant, ATLANTIC (Sept. 2017), https:/
/www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/09/innocence-is-irrelevant/
534171/ [https://perma.cc/AWB2-F32W] (citing STUNTZ).
171
See Nancy J. King, Appeals, in ACAD. FOR JUST., 3 REFORMING CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: PRETRIAL AND TRIAL PROCESSES 254 & n.6–7 (Erik Luna ed., 2017) (citing
SEAN ROSENMERKEL, MATTHEW DUROSE, & DONALD FAROLE, JR., BUREAU OF JUST.
STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2006– STATISTICAL
TABLES 1 (rev. Nov. 2010), and NICOLE L. WATERS, ANNE GALLEGOS, JAMES GREEN, &
MARTHA ROZSI, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CRIMINAL APPEALS IN STATE
COURTS 4–5 (2015)). See also Nancy J. King & Michael Heise, Misdemeanor Appeals, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1933, 1938 (2019) (“We estimate that, at most, approximately eight in ten thousand misdemeanor judgments are appealed.”).
172
King, supra note 172, at 254.
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lation. At a minimum, federal courts should carefully examine
that premise of Younger abstention.
3. Evolving Federal Practice
On the other side of the ledger, federal civil practice also
has evolved in the intervening decades in ways that are incompatible with Younger abstention. Here it is useful to return to
the stages of litigation (justiciability, merits, remedy) that Fallon describes in articulating his Equilibrium Theory to reiterate
how Younger abstention operates.173 In the typical litigation
timeline, the pleading, discovery, and trial phases identify and
resolve disputed issues of fact and law, while in the remedial
phase courts justify and tailor appropriate relief. Younger abstention turns on highly factual issues—the threat of irreparable injury and the adequacy of the state court forum—and yet
expects courts to evaluate them at the pleadings stage before
discovery and without factfinding. Using Fallon’s stages,
Younger abstention reframes a remedial concern (stage three)
as a justiciability issue (stage one) that compresses legal and
factual merits questions (stage two) about the right itself, the
existence and adequacy of state court remedies, and the justification for injunctive relief.
Today, the Younger inquiry seems at odds with the rigorous
claim vetting in early stage federal litigation and the careful
screening of disputed factual issues.174 All plaintiffs must establish standing and allege facts that give rise to a plausible
claim “for each type of relief sought.”175 Civil rights plaintiffs
must do even more to sue local officials, establish standing for
injunctive relief, overcome immunities, and avoid specific bars
on challenging criminal convictions.176 These demanding
173

See Fallon, supra note 16, at 639.
See John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States,
122 YALE L.J. 522, 527 (2012).
175
ODonnell v. Harris County, 227 F. Supp. 3d 706, 724 (S.D. Tex. 2016)
(citing Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009) (citing City of Los
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983))). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 687 (2009) (holding that a complaint must “plead sufficient facts to state a
claim”); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (requiring that a
complaint must contain enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face).
176
See, e.g., James M. Wagstaffe, Supreme Court’s Stealth Revolution in Civil
Procedure, LEXISNEXIS (July 3, 2019), https://www.lexisnexis.com/community/
lexis-legal-advantage/b/insights/posts/supreme-court-s-stealth-revolution-incivil-procedure-by-jim-wagstaffe [https://perma.cc/4JKW-VBAB] (discussing
how plaintiffs view the Supreme Court as limiting access to justice by empowering
defendants with powerful procedural tools); ODonnell, 227 F. Supp. 3d at 725
(citing Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)) (requiring
174
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pleading requirements act as a powerful filter in identifying
which claims and parties survive dismissal and advance to the
merits stage.177
These rigorous early stage mechanisms for vetting claims
provide a better gatekeeper than Younger abstention for determining which cases get to stay in federal court. Younger abstention can result in the dismissal of a properly filed,
meritorious federal civil rights suit based on a concern that the
claim might eventually warrant declaratory or injunctive relief.
When a federal court abstains, it is abdicating its congressionally mandated jurisdiction based on a preliminary understanding of the claim. Courts have abstained even in the
absence of a pending state criminal prosecution and without
fully understanding the availability and adequacy of state criminal remedies. Younger abstention is unnecessary for a claim
that would not survive early-stage vetting (due to jurisdictional
defects or failure to state a claim) and hard to justify for a claim
that survives such rigorous testing. The preferred approach
would be to hear the case, decide the claim, determine whether
declaratory or injunctive relief is justified, and explain how
federalism concerns modify the relief granted.

that localities’ actions were taken pursuant to local policy or custom). To allege a
claim under § 1983 against a municipality, “a plaintiff must show that (1) an
official policy (2) promulgated by the municipal policymaker (3) was the moving
force behind the violation of a constitutional right.” ODonnell, 227 F. Supp. 3d at
725 (citing Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 847 (5th Cir. 2009)).
ODonnell also recognized an exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity for suits
for prospective injunctive relief against individuals in their official capacity, as
agents of the state or a state entity under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
See also Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105 (requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate standing to
pursue injunctive relief).
177
Racial discrimination and qualified immunity are two examples of how
strict legal requirements may operate to eliminate the need to resolve factual
issues. See Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of African American-Owned Media, 140
S. Ct. 1009, 1021 (2020) (holding that to allege a claim of discrimination, a
plaintiff must allege that his race was the but-for cause of the injury). Qualified
immunity has evolved from a triable issue of fact that turned on the official’s state
of mind to a legal issue that does not consider subjective intent and can be
resolved on pleadings. See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247–48 (1974)
(whether the official acted in good faith and reasonably under the circumstances);
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818–19 (1982) (whether the official violated
“clearly established” constitutional law); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,
641 (1987) (whether, in light of the information the agent possessed, the warrantless search violated clearly established law); See also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677
(requiring plaintiff claiming discrimination to allege that the official purposefully
discriminated on the basis of race, religion, or national origin).
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B. Distributed Federalism
Distributed federalism captures the transformation of
Younger––from a policy favoring abstention to a principle that
informs adjudication and remedying of constitutional violations. As courts revisit Younger abstention, they are relying on
a different expression of federalism. Recent suits, especially
ODonnell v. Harris County, illustrate how federal courts are
rejecting Younger but still relying on federalism to shape constitutional rights and remedies.178 Stage one in ODonnell focused on claim vetting, including a motion to abstain under
Younger, which the court rejected. Stage two focused on the
remaining legal and factual issues, specifically the alleged
Equal Protection and Due Process violations and the request
for prospective injunctive relief. In stage three, the district and
appellate courts hammered out the scope of the legal rights and
injunctive relief imposed in state court, expressly invoking federalism concerns. ODonnell is not unique in this regard as
other courts have rejected Younger abstention while incorporating federalism concerns at later stages. Distributed federalism acknowledges that by hearing a properly filed case and
evaluating it like any other, courts can express their federalism
concerns at the merits and remedial stages. This approach
ensures that courts’ reliance on federalism as a limitation on
rights and remedies is explained, justified, and reviewable.
1. Early Stage: Rejecting Younger
The most important insight about ODonnell is that the
court treated the case like any other at the early stage: it evaluated based on the pleadings whether the plaintiffs had stated
valid legal claims. The district court in ODonnell refused to
decide the plaintiffs’ central legal claim, which challenged the
adequacy of the state court pretrial detention process, at the
motion to dismiss stage.179 ODonnell exemplifies how courts
are relying on a mix of arguments to reject Younger abstention:
construing Younger narrowly, recognizing that abstention is
“exceptional” and “disfavored,” rejecting abstention, and following Gerstein.180
178
Redish, supra note 130, at 74 (arguing that Younger abstention violates
separation of powers and its “total abolition would not seriously undermine the
efficient workings of judicial federalism”); Federal Court Reform, supra note 5, at
111 (arguing that Younger abstention “should be abandoned”).
179
892 F.3d 147, 156 (5th Cir. 2018).
180
ODonnell, 227 F. Supp. 3d at 734–37 (denying motion to dismiss because
plaintiff’s suit did not meet “exceptional” circumstances justifying Younger abstention); Walker v. City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245, 1254 (11th Cir. 2018) (deny-
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Each of the three named plaintiffs in ODonnell was arrested on misdemeanor charges and detained because they
were unable to afford bail.181 They claimed that the bail-setting policies for misdemeanor defendants violated state law,
due process, and equal protection because the courts relied on
the bail schedule without regard for individuals’ ability to pay
and discriminated against indigent defendants.182 The defendants in ODonnell—Harris County, the sheriff, county judges,
and hearing officers—promptly moved to dismiss on various
grounds including Younger abstention, standing, failure to
state a claim, improper party under § 1983, and immunities.
They argued that “all three conditions for Younger abstention
are met” because the plaintiffs “‘were in ongoing criminal proceedings’” when they filed their federal lawsuit and could “challenge their bail in the very proceedings at issue or through
filing habeas corpus petitions.”183
Rejecting abstention, the court in ODonnell relied on a
blended strategy, holding that Younger does not apply but
would not require abstention “even if” it did.184 The court explained that Gerstein, not Younger, applied because the plaintiffs challenged a procedural issue that neither tested the
merits of the state prosecution nor sought to enjoin it.185 Just
as in Gerstein, this challenge to pretrial detention would be
“mooted by conviction or exoneration.”186 But “[e]ven if
Younger applied,” the court reasoned, “this case would fail
Younger’s conditions for abstention.”187 This blended strategy
bolstered the court’s analysis by showing that Younger and
Gerstein yielded the same result.188
ing motion to dismiss based on Younger abstention, which “has become
disfavored”); Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 766–67 (9th Cir. 2018) (reversing
dismissal based on Younger’s abstention because plaintiff’s suit would not interfere with state prosecution and because he satisfied Younger’s “irreparable harm
exception”).
181
ODonnell v. Harris County, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1062–63 (S.D. Tex.
2017).
182
Id. at 1063–64 (observing that the judicial officials were legally proscribed
under Texas law from mechanically applying the bail schedule to a given arrestee
and instead had to conduct an individualized review based on five enumerated
factors, which included the defendant’s ability to pay, the charge, and community
safety, citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 17.15).
183
ODonnell, 227 F. Supp. 3d at 734.
184
Id. at 735.
185
Id. at 736 (citing Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577 (1973)).
186
Id. at 735 (“[M]any misdemeanor defendants plead guilty to end their pretrial detention.”)
187
Id.
188
See Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 766–67 (9th Cir. 2018).
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The court in ODonnell narrowly construed the first and
third prongs of the Younger test, holding that there was no
“ongoing proceeding” in state court and that the “adequacy
prong” was “not met.”189 Bail hearings are not themselves
criminal prosecutions, the court reasoned, so “there are no
ongoing state proceedings to which this court can or should
defer.”190 Other courts have similarly ruled that there were no
pending judicial proceedings when plaintiffs had been arrested
and booked, but not formally charged,191 or when plaintiffs
were arrested and detained for unpaid court debts.192 One
appellate court held that Younger abstention is not required
when the state prosecution is initiated after the federal court
resolves substantive issues.193 Younger’s third prong was “not
met,” the court found, because the adequacy of the state bail
process was the merits issue: “the adequacy of a timely hearing[ ] is precisely what the plaintiffs are challenging in this
case.”194 Younger did not apply because “[t]o find that the
plaintiffs have an adequate hearing on their constitutional

189
ODonnell, 227 F. Supp. 3d at 735–36;see, e.g., Agriesti v. MGM Grand
Hotels, Inc., 53 F.3d 1000, 1002 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that Younger does not
apply when plaintiffs are not formally charged in state court because arrest is an
executive, not a judicial act). But see Trump v. Vance, 395 F. Supp. 3d 283, 294
(S.D.N.Y. 2019) (abstaining under Younger and finding that a grand jury proceeding is a pending criminal prosecution for Younger purposes).
190
See ODonnell, 227 F. Supp. 3d at 735.
191
Buffin v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, No. 15-CV-04959-YGR, 2016 WL
374230, at *2–3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2016) (mentioning Gerstein for the proposition
that Younger does not bar a claim that could not be raised in a criminal prosecution and relying on Agriesti, where the plaintiffs were arrested and booked, but not
formally charged before filing suit, so the detention was an executive decision and
not judicially imposed); Welchen v. Cty. of Sacramento, No. 2:16-cv-00185-TLNKJN, 2016 WL 5930563, at *6–7 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2016).
192
Cain v. City of New Orleans, 186 F. Supp. 3d 536, 550 (E.D. La. 2016)
(distinguishing Bice). The Seventh Circuit held that Younger abstention is not
required if the federal court resolves substantive issues before the initiation of a
pending state prosecution. See Ewell v. Toney, 853 F.3d 911, 916 (7th Cir. 2017).
The Defendant in Ewell was held for more than forty-eight hours without a probable cause determination, which amounted to false arrest and unlawful detention.
See id. at 915. Younger abstention did not apply because a proceeding was not
pending when Defendant filed her § 1983 case, so the Hicks rule did not apply
because when the Defendant’s charges were filed, the case was no longer in its
“infancy.” See id.
193
See Agriesti, 53 F.3d at 1002 (stating that Younger does not apply when
plaintiffs are not formally charged in state court because arrest is an executive not
a judicial act).
194
ODonnell v. Harris County, 892 F.3d 147, 156 (5th Cir. 2018); ODonnell,
227 F. Supp. 3d at 736 (citing Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577 (1973)).
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claim in state court would decide [its] merits.”195 The Fifth
Circuit affirmed, quoting the district court on this point.196
Proceeding with a mix of caution and resolve, the court in
ODonnell relied on “[c]areful case management . . . not abstention.”197 The court used this phrase to reject the defendants’
argument that abstention was appropriate because evolving
policy reforms at the local level provide the plaintiffs an adequate state court remedy.198 While acknowledging that local
corrective action could resolve the suit at some point, the court
found that it was not a basis to abstain. Instead, in the same
order rejecting abstention, the court held that the plaintiffs’
due process and equal protection claims “survive[d]” dismissal,
set forth the legal standard for both claims, and framed the key
factual questions for the evidentiary hearing.199 The Equal
Protection analysis would require the court to “resolve critical
factual disputes about the Harris County bail system[,]” including the efficacy of bail in securing court appearances, whether
courts consider inability to pay before imposing bail, and the
number of misdemeanor defendants detained based on indigency alone.200 The Due Process analysis would require the
court to evaluate the “federal, state, and local rules” against the
“customs or practices of applying these rules.”201
Distributed federalism is consistent with careful case management in that it shifts federalism concerns to the merits and
remedial stages, when courts have a full understanding of the
alleged violations and justification for injunctive relief.202
Courts recognize that abstention means dismissing a valid,
significant legal claim in favor of state court proceedings that
195
ODonnell, 227 F. Supp. 3d at 736 (“This factor is not properly included in
the abstention analysis here.”). See Rodriguez v. Providence Cmty. Corr., Inc.,
155 F. Supp. 3d 758, 765–66 (M.D. Tenn. 2015) (Younger abstention is inappropriate if the state proceeding would come so late that the probationers would first
have to suffer the deprivation they allege).
196
ODonnell, 892 F.3d at 156 (“[T]o find that the plaintiffs have an adequate
hearing on their constitutional claim in state court would decide its merits.”
(alterations in original omitted)).
197
ODonnell, 227 F. Supp. 3d at 737.
198
Id. (rejecting state defendants’ argument that policy reforms justified abstention and responding, “[c]areful case management to allow time for reform, not
abstention, is the better response to the defendants’ argument.”).
199
Id. at 730–31, 733 (“Rational basis is a factual inquiry. Courts are properly
reluctant to dismiss without permitting plaintiffs to make a factual showing that a
government policy is irrational.”).
200
Id. at 731.
201
See id. at 732.
202
See Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 44, at 265 (“Younger-style remedial
abstention is wrong, but a measured regard for principles of federalism—favoring
exclusively neither the national nor the state governments—is not.”).
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might not provide a full opportunity to litigate or remedy those
claims. As ODonnell illustrates, distributed federalism resolves
that difficulty by allowing courts to sort cases as they normally
would with sensitivity to federalism.
2. Merits Stage: The Legal Policy in Fact
When courts get past Younger abstention, they face the
challenging task of examining the factual and legal aspects of
the constitutional claims. Distributed federalism empowers
courts to probe the adequacy and availability of state court
procedures and remedies and the justification for any injunctive relief. The district court in ODonnell conducted an eightday hearing that yielded a remarkable 116-page ruling that
detailed local pretrial detention policies in fact, pinpointed the
violations, identified the harms to defendants, and justified
injunctive relief.203 The court’s central finding was that the
state court pretrial detention procedures violated state law, due
process, and equal protection and that injunctive relief was
necessary to correct these harms.
Local court practices on pretrial detention, the court found
in ODonnell, were constitutionally defective. Many features of
the Harris County process, at least on paper, were similar to
federal pretrial detention statutes and would permit, though
not require, constitutionally “minimum standards and procedures.”204 State law and local practices prohibited routine use
of money bail, permitted unsecured bonds, required individualized hearings that considered the individual’s ability to pay,
and afforded prompt judicial review.205 These policies included
an individualized detention hearing within twenty-four hours
of arrest and “next business day” review by county judges.206
203
ODonnell v. Harris County, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1062, 1084 (S.D. Tex.
2018) (acknowledging a “growing movement against using secured money bail to
achieve a misdemeanor arrestee’s continued detention”). The district court situated the issues within a broader legal and national context and considered a wide
range of sources including testimony from fact and expert witnesses detailing
local bail procedure and its impacts. The court heard from an assistant district
attorney, the local sheriff, a hearing officer, three county judges, and a pretrial
detention consultant who had been assisting Harris County on implementing
reforms to its pretrial process during the pendency of the lawsuit. It also heard
from experts in criminology, court administration, and pretrial detention, each of
whom had analyzed county data, and a retired judge familiar with the use of
nonmonetary bail in misdemeanor cases. Id.
204
Id. at 1084.
205
Id. at 1086 (citing HARRIS CNTY. CRIM. CTS., RULES OF COURT 17 (2020)).
206
TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC. art. 2.09, 17.15, 17.033; HARRIS CNTY. CRIM. CTS.,
RULES OF COURT 9–10 (2020).
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In fact the “unwritten custom and practice” in Harris
County fell far short of these standards.207 Local officials
(prosecutors, hearing officers, and county judges) relied almost
exclusively on money bail without individualized findings or
meaningful judicial review.208 The individualized hearing
(where bail is usually set) did not occur within twenty-four
hours of arrest, rarely lasted more than a minute, and provided
no opportunity for arrestees to speak or submit evidence relevant to the detention decision.209 Local data showed that officials “impose[d] the scheduled bail amounts on a secured basis
about 90 percent of the time,”210 rarely assigned an unsecured
personal bond,211 and routinely rejected recommendations for
release by their own pretrial service officers.212 Finally, despite
a right to prompt judicial review before a county judge, there
was no meaningful review: arrestees often waited days to see a
county judge who adjusted bail amounts or granted unsecured
bonds in less than one percent of cases.213
The as-applied process failures in ODonnell underscore a
key risk of Younger abstention—namely that courts will evaluate the adequacy of state court remedies or the threat of irreparable harm without probing the factual realities.214 The
process failures in ODonnell resulted in prolonged, unjustified
detention of misdemeanor arrestees that hurt defendants, especially the poor, for whom “secured money bail function[ed] as
a pretrial detention order.”215 Local data showed that the pretrial risk assessment tool used by local courts discriminated
against the poor by scoring poverty indicators (such as not
owning a car) the same as prior criminal violations or prior
failures to appear in court; hearing officers imposed bail knowing that it would result in detention for indigent defendants,
and secured release did not result in better court appearance
207

See ODonnell, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1130–31.
See id. at 1059–60, 1068.
209
See id. at 1093.
210
Id. at 1130.
211
Id. at 1151.
212
Id. at 1095 (stating that official rejected suggestions to release the person
on personal bond sixty-six percent of the time).
213
See id. at 1104, 1131, 1154.
214
Wallace v. Kern, 520 F.2d 400, 407–08 (2d Cir. 1975) (rejecting district
court’s finding that bail reviews were perfunctory and pointing to “unlimited opportunities” for bail review under state law); Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103,
126 (1975) (requiring a judicial determination of probable cause before or
promptly after arrest as a prerequisite for detention).
215
ODonnell, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1130. See also Russell v. Harris County, 454
F. Supp. 3d 624, 640 (S.D. Tex. 2020) (challenging the pretrial bail system for
setting the amount of bond for indigent felony defendants in Harris County).
208
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rates or law-abiding conduct before trial.216 Voluminous empirical data and academic literature reinforced that defendants
who are detained pretrial fare worse at every stage of adjudication: they are significantly more likely to plead guilty, be sentenced to imprisonment, and receive sentences that are on
average twice as long as released defendants.217 The district
court also noted the collateral harms of detention, including
job loss, family stress, and even an increase in likeliness to
commit crime.218 These critical findings would not have come
to light if the court only assessed, at the dismissal stage, the
adequacy of the process as written, instead of as applied.
3. Final Stage: Remedying Violations
Federal courts remain cautious about finding and correcting constitutional violations in state criminal proceedings
and invoke federalism to limit the scope of federal rights and
injunctive relief. In Walker and ODonnell, the appellate courts
rejected Younger abstention, but narrowed the scope of the
constitutional right and streamlined the injunctive relief so
that what remained was a bright line rule that avoided direct
federal oversight. As in Gerstein, these courts articulated important rights relying on a flexible but clear constitutional
standard without federal enforcement. Such broad rules may
leave both sides dissatisfied, thus making the additional point
that the litigants may fare better in state court or through a
negotiated settlement.219 Both courts also reinforced that
216
The district court concluded that, in fact, “release on secured financial
conditions does not assure better rates of appearance or of law-abiding conduct
before trial compared to release on unsecured bonds or nonfinancial conditions of
supervision.” ODonnell, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1131–32.
217
Id. at 1130–31.
218
ODonnell v. Harris County, 892 F.3d 147, 155 (5th Cir. 2018).
219
Successful settlements on pretrial detention reform include: Agreed Final
Judgment, Willey v. Ewing, No. 3:18-cv-00081 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 2019), ECF No.
36; Order, Rodriguez v. Providence Cmty. Corr., No. 3:15-cv-01048 (M.D. Tenn.
Aug. 8, 2018), ECF No. 232; Consent Judgment, Powell v. City of St. Ann, No.
4:15-cv-00840 (E.D. Mo. May 4, 2018), ECF No. 42; Consent Decree Granting 38
Joint Motion, Cooper v. City of Dothan, No. 1:15-cv-00425-WKW-TFM (M.D. Ala.
Apr. 13, 2016), ECF No. 40; Notice of Settlement, Kennedy v. City of Biloxi, No.
1:15-cv-00348 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 4, 2016); Notice of Settlement, Chevon Thompson
v. Moss Point, No. 1:15-cv-00182-LG-RHW (S.D. Miss. Oct. 14, 2015); Judgment,
Jones v. City of Clanton (Varden v. City of Clanton), No. 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC
(M.D. Ala. Sept. 14, 2015), ECF No. 77; Order Granting Motion for Settlement,
Snow v. Lambert, No. 15-567-SDD-RLB (M.D. La. Sept. 3, 2015), ECF No. 29;
Joint Motion to Approve Consent Judgment, Jenkins v. City of Jennings, No.
4:15-cv-00252-CEJ (E.D. Mo. Aug. 26, 2015), ECF No. 13; Order (Settlement),
Pierce v. City of Velda, No. 4:15-cv-00570 (E.D. Mo. June 3, 2015), ECF No. 16;
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Younger might bar more ambitious requests for injunctive
relief.
The appellate courts in ODonnell and Walker narrowly construed the constitutional rights at issue without relying expressly on federalism. In ODonnell, the Fifth Circuit affirmed
the due process and equal protection violations, including the
district court’s “factual findings” showing that secured bail was
imposed “automatically on indigent” defendants without regard
for their ability to pay, operated as detention orders, were an
“instrument of oppression,”220 and discriminated against the
poor.221 The court disagreed on the scope of the due process
liberty interest, stating that the right recognized by the district
court was “too broad” because there is no “automatic right to
pretrial release.”222 Still, the court agreed that local procedures were constitutionally “inadequate––even when applied to
our narrower understanding of the liberty interest at stake.”223
Federalism concerns prompted the courts in Walker and
ODonnell to cut back on the scope of injunctive relief initially
ordered in the trial courts. In ODonnell, the district court had
identified five ingredients for an adequate pretrial detention
hearing, including a hearing within twenty-four hours of arrest
and written findings to support orders to detain.224 The
twenty-four-hour requirement was required by state law but
had not been enforced, and the written findings were intended
to facilitate meaningful judicial review, which was also found to
be lacking.225 The Fifth Circuit eliminated both requirements
because they would be too burdensome. On the written findings, the court stated that “such a drastic increase in the burden imposed upon Hearing Officers will do more harm than
good” and will require some “50,000 written opinions per year
Order, Mitchell v. Montgomery, No. 2:14-cv-00186 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 17, 2014), ECF
No. 65.
220
See ODonnell, 892 F.3d at 159, 166 (agreeing that the county’s pretrial
detention procedures discriminated against the poor).
221
See id. at 161.
222
Id. at 158.
223
Id. at 159.
224
Id. (“Due process requires: (1) notice that the financial and other resource
information Pretrial Services officers collect is for the purpose of determining a
misdemeanor arrestee’s eligibility for release or detention; (2) a hearing at which
the arrestee has an opportunity to be heard and to present evidence; (3) an
impartial decisionmaker; (4) a written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied on to find that a secured financial condition is the only reasonable
way to assure the arrestee’s appearance at hearings and law-abiding behavior
before trial; and (5) timely proceedings within 24 hours of arrest.”).
225
Id. at 154, 160.
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to satisfy due process.”226 Requiring magistrates to specify
reasons would suffice, the court held. And the “24-hour requirement is too strict under federal constitutional standards,”
which merely requires a probable cause hearing within fortyeight hours.227
In Walker, the Eleventh Circuit also adopted a forty-eighthour rule instead of the stricter twenty-four-hour rule imposed
by the district court.228 Local officials in Walker adopted a
“Standing Bail Order” shortly after they were sued in federal
court that included a bail schedule and authorized wealthbased detention pending the forty-eight-hour probable cause
hearing.229 The district court initially found the Standing Bail
Order to be unconstitutional and ordered local officials “to implement post-arrest procedures that comply with the Constitution.”230 The Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding that order was
“insufficiently specific,”231 and on remand the district court
ordered the local courts to provide a detention hearing within
twenty-four hours.232 But the Eleventh Circuit vacated the
twenty-four-hour requirement, holding that local courts could
detain indigents based on a bail schedule pending the fortyeight-hour hearing.233 Citing ODonnell, the court agreed that
“indigency determinations for purposes of setting bail are presumptively constitutional if made within 48 hours of arrest,”
adding that federal courts should grant “States wide latitude to
fashion procedures for setting bail.”234 Because these findings
meant that the Standing Bail Order would likely withstand
constitutional scrutiny, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction.235
These courts, while firmly rejecting Younger abstention,
did not reject federalism. This approach is consistent with Gerstein in several respects: it limits the constitutional right in
light of federalism concerns and relies on mostly declaratory
relief that articulates a bright-line rule without specifying particulars. This bright-line, hands-off approach affords state
226

Id. at 160.
Id.
228
Walker v. City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245, 1253, 1281 (11th Cir. 2018).
229
Id. at 1252.
230
Id. at 1253 (quoting Walker v. City of Calhoun (Walker I), No. 4:15-CV0170-HLM, 2016 WL 361612, at *14 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 28, 2016).
231
Id.
232
Id.
233
See id. at 1271–72.
234
Id. at 1266, 1268.
235
Id. at 220.
227
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courts “wide latitude” in achieving compliance without federal
oversight or enforcement.
4. The Shadow of O’Shea
O’Shea, which continues to cast a shadow over Younger
analysis, can be reassessed using the distributed federalism
model. O’Shea represented the “most dramatic extension of
Younger” based on a strongly worded policy of federal noninterference in state criminal proceedings.236 Today, courts continue to invoke O’Shea to warn that federal courts will not
entertain constitutional claims, regardless of their merit, that
contemplate day-to-day oversight of state criminal proceedings.237 While both Walker and ODonnell distinguished
O’Shea, they relied on it to signal that Younger abstention
would be justified if the relief sought is “intrusive and unworkable”238 or involved “‘continuous supervision by the federal
court.’”239 As these cases show, the distributed federalism
model mostly alleviates that worry by relying on traditional
litigation vetting and integrating federalism at every stage of
the proceeding. Revisiting O’Shea helps to illustrate the point.
As a preliminary matter, by interpreting O’Shea more narrowly in light of Sprint, courts likely would find that Younger
does not apply because the first and third prongs cannot be
met. In O’Shea there were no pending state court prosecutions, so it seems obvious that the first prong of the Younger
test would not be met.240 Though critics lodged this point long
ago, it is sharper after Sprint, which supports applying Younger
narrowly.241 The third prong also could not be met because the
plaintiffs in O’Shea challenged the adequacy of the state-court
process. As Professor Tribe observed, the plaintiffs in O’Shea
“challenged the constitutionality of the very judicial processes
to which the ordinary Younger rules would remand them.”242
So in O’Shea, just as in ODonnell, “to find that the plaintiffs
236

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 31, at 902.
See ODonnell v. Harris County, 892 F.3d 147, 157 (5th Cir. 2018); Walker,
901 F.3d at 1254–55.
238
See Walker, 901 F.3d at 1255.
239
ODonnell, 892 F.3d at 157 (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 501
(1974)).
240
O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 495–96; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 31, at 902 (discussing O’Shea and citing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 207 (2d ed.
1988)).
241
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 31, at 902.
242
Id. (discussing O’Shea and citing TRIBE, supra note 240, at 207.

R

237

R

R
R
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have an adequate hearing on their constitutional claim in state
court would decide [the] merits” of their federal claim.243
Evaluating O’Shea through the lens of distributed federalism shows that the risk of day-to-day federal interference in
state criminal proceedings is negligible. Early stage vetting
would screen constitutional claims for standing, legal validity,
and immunities. In O’Shea the Supreme Court dismissed the
plaintiffs’ claim on ripeness grounds because they were neither
currently facing nor likely to face prosecution again in the municipal courts.244 Lack of standing, not abstention, would justify dismissal of the entire case, and any remaining claims
against local judges, the prosecutor, and law enforcement
would be analyzed for absolute and qualified immunity.245
Assuming no standing and immunity problems existed, the
federal court next would determine claim by claim whether the
plaintiffs had stated a valid legal challenge to wealth-based
detention, selective enforcement, imposition of trial fines, or
discriminatory sentencing.246 Today plaintiffs might be less
likely to allege such diverse claims in a single suit, but even if
they did, the court would scrutinize the sufficiency of the
pleadings as to each claim. Surviving claims would advance to
the merits stage for summary judgment or fact finding. The
Supreme Court in O’Shea assumed, without examining the issue, that numerous state remedies were available to victims of
the alleged discriminatory practices, including substitution of a
judge, change of venue, direct appeal, state postconviction review, judicial disciplinary proceedings, and federal habeas relief.247 Today when plaintiffs challenge the state judicial
process, the viability and efficacy of those state court remedies
243
ODonnell, 892 F.3d at 156 (quoting ODonnell v. Harris County, 227
F. Supp. 3d 706, 736 (S.D. Tex. 2017)) (alterations in original omitted).
244
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 31, at 902 n.98 (citing O’Shea, 414 U.S. at
495–99); see also City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103–06 (1983) (noting
that the plaintiff lacked standing to seek injunctive relief because he could not
demonstrate that he was likely to suffer future injury from the use of chokeholds
by police officers, and highlighting the Court’s focus on standing in O’Shea); Rizzo
v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 372 (1976) (reiterating the holding in O’Shea that past
wrongs do not establish an immediate threat of injury sufficient to invoke federal
jurisdiction).
245
See ODonnell v. Harris County, 227 F. Supp. 3d 706, 755 (S.D. Tex. 2017)
(citing the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–317, which
amended § 1983 to make judicial officers acting in their judicial capacities immune from injunctive relief unless “a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. 42 U.S.C. § 1983”).
246
O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 493.
247
Id. at 502.

R
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cannot be assumed, but must be examined in fact, just as in
ODonnell.
If constitutional violations are found, the relief ordered
would not necessarily be “intrusive and unworkable” or involve
day-to-day supervision, as the Court feared in O’Shea. Rather,
as ODonnell, Walker, and Gerstein show, the relief would be
mostly declaratory, for example, by setting forth clear rules on
whether or when wealth-based detention is allowed, trial fines
are permissible, or prosecution or sentencing policies violate
equal protection or due process, ensuring that state courts
enjoy “wide latitude” to comply with constitutional requirements and are not overburdened by them. This kind of relief is
unlikely to involve day-to-day federal interference.
Federal courts can articulate and vindicate federal constitutional rights without subjecting state courts to the kind of
intrusive and unworkable interference that Younger and
O’Shea aimed to prevent. Distributed federalism contemplates
that courts’ willingness to grant injunctive relief will vary and
may evolve over time. Either way, courts that seek to limit or
justify rights and relief can explain that on the record, allowing
the litigants and reviewing courts to weigh in.248 Distributing
federalism across every stage does not predict outcomes or
eliminate federalism, but it does serve to make it more transparent and responsive to alleged violations.
III
THE CHALLENGES OF DISTRIBUTED FEDERALISM
Distributed federalism is a straightforward approach but
raises new questions for litigants and courts. Gerstein, ODonnell, and Walker are examples of distributed federalism and
reveal its benefits and built-in limitations. While these courts
rejected Younger abstention, they can be seen as expressing
federalism in other ways by limiting the scope of the right and
dramatically limiting injunctive relief imposed on state courts
so as to avoid burdensome requirements or intrusive federal
oversight. This approach provides profound benefits in that
courts are deciding, not abstaining from, important constitutional issues that have been underdeveloped for decades.
These plaintiffs chalked up significant victories in persuading
the courts to articulate federal rights, find violations, and order
injunctive relief. But appellate courts took corrective action on
248
See generally Fallon, supra note 16, at 701 (explaining, with respect to the
Equilibrium Thesis, the value of courts explaining their refusal to grant injunctive
relief).

R
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the scope of rights and relief, warning that Younger would prohibit claims for broader relief. As courts pivot away from
Younger abstention, many appear to remain firmly committed
to federalism.
Younger is a doctrine in transition, raising questions about
how it should be applied and whether federal courts are a
promising venue for criminal justice reform. First, does distributed federalism add value or merely swap one form of federalism for another? Distributed federalism supports greater
transparency and accountability so that federalism choices are
visible, explained, and reviewable. Second, should Younger abstention continue to categorically bar certain kinds of claims in
federal court and, if so, which ones? The short answer is that
Younger should bar relief that is actually available in pending
state criminal proceedings but not eliminate federal civil remedies that are necessary to vindicate constitutional rights.249
Third, in light of Gerstein, ODonnell, and Walker, can federal
courts impose injunctive relief sufficient to achieve constitutional compliance? In ODonnell and Walker, federal appellate
courts expressly tolerated unconstitutional practices, such as
wealth-based detention. These cases hint that those rights and
remedies questions will be the new battleground.
A. Transparent Federalism
Distributed federalism recognizes that the policy of federal
noninterference remains a strong force even as reliance on
Younger abstention wanes. Younger built on courts’ institutional reluctance to grant injunctive relief absent a very specific
showing of need (no adequate remedy and irreparable injury).
Though Younger and its progeny deterred plaintiffs from suing
in federal court, today plaintiffs are bringing such suits to
achieve criminal justice reform in a changed landscape.
Courts are rejecting Younger abstention, acknowledging that it
is “exceptional” and “disfavored,”250 narrowly applying its
249
See Pugh v. Rainwater, 483 F.2d 778, 782 (5th Cir. 1973) (“[W]hen a
plaintiff who happens also to be a defendant in a simultaneous state court proceeding seeks to challenge an aspect of the criminal justice system which adversely affects him but which cannot be vindicated in the state court trial, comity
is no bar to his challenge.”), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
U.S. 103 (1975); Fallon, supra note 16, at 1240 (observing that there is no disruption to state proceedings if the federal suit seeks relief that is not available in the
criminal prosecution).
250
Sprint Commc’ns v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 73 (2013) (describing circumstances justifying Younger abstention as “exceptional”); Walker v. City of Calhoun,
901 F.3d 1245, 1254 (11th Cir. 2018) (acknowledging that Younger abstention
“has become disfavored”).

R
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terms, and instead incorporating federalism concerns at the
merits and remedial stages and on appeal. Federalism continues to limit the extent to which federal courts can provide an
effective venue for criminal justice reform. Even if the results
are limited, this transformation of Younger is positive.
Distributed federalism provides a flexible framework for
evaluating federalism in civil rights cases challenging the constitutionality of state criminal proceedings. These cases often
raise urgent, recurring issues of liberty, safety, dignity, and
fairness in state criminal justice systems. As a doctrine of
avoidance, Younger favored state-court actors (prosecutors,
judges, and other local officials), who enjoyed a kind of federalism-based immunity.251 Distributed federalism shows how instead of abstaining, courts can hear claims without
abandoning federalism principles. A motion to dismiss provides an early opportunity for the court to explain what makes
a viable claim and whether the plaintiffs have satisfied that
standard. The same is true with procedural issues, such as
class actions, and justiciability issues, such as standing, ripeness, and mootness. Rejecting abstention will require courts to
resolve and develop the law on these underdeveloped issues.
Distributed federalism promotes transparency and accountability in federal and state courts. Fallon’s Equilibrium
Thesis also shared the goal of fostering “greater transparency
and integrity of analysis.”252 His purpose was not to stop
courts from worrying about the overall balance of relief, but
rather for them to abandon “confusing and cynicism-inducing”
manipulations that obscure rather than illuminate their reasoning.253 “If courts are troubled about unacceptable remedies, they should be willing to say so openly and to shoulder
the responsibility for withholding injunctive relief within a
framework that calls for a weighing of public and private interests.”254 Distributed federalism supports a similar goal.
Younger abstention cut the litigation short, required a lessthan-fulsome exploration or explanation of the issues, and
made it harder to challenge the result. Going forward, courts
will continue to rely on federalism to limit the scope of constitutional rights or procedures, limit the burdens on state courts,
and limit federal intrusion into state court proceedings. It is
251
See Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 44, at 264 (arguing that Younger made
federalism “always decisive in favor of the state”).
252
Fallon, supra note 16, at 701.
253
Id.
254
Id.

R
R
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better for courts to do so openly, explaining their choices on the
record so that litigants and appellate courts can participate in
developing rights and shaping remedies. This transparency
enhances federal court accountability for their decisions and
will enhance enforcement of constitutional rights in state criminal proceedings. While such progress may be gradual or uneven, it is preferable to the total avoidance of these issues due to
Younger abstention.
B. Which Rights
Federal cases triggering Younger abstention primarily
touch on three categories of claims that are differentiated by
the nature of the claim and relief sought. The first category is
Younger itself, when a plaintiff challenges the constitutionality
of a state or local criminal law that would provide a substantive
or merits defense to prosecution. The second category of
claims are those in Gerstein, ODonnell, and Walker, which
challenge a procedure within a state criminal proceeding, such
as pretrial detention, debtors’ prison, or shackling.255 The
third category would include broader systemic challenges like
the one in Luckey v. Miller, which alleged that the local indigent
defense system deprived indigent defendants of their Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.256 Federal courts generally
should reject Younger abstention if there is no pending criminal
proceeding or if the claim cannot be vindicated in the pending
criminal case. The recent cases provide a compelling argument
that Younger abstention does not apply to the second category
(claims patterned on Gerstein) and should extend to the third
category (systemic challenges). Though overruling Younger
seems improbable and even unwise, as it could seriously disrupt state criminal proceedings, courts should more carefully
analyze the critical elements: the adequacy and actual availability of state court remedies to timely and fully redress the
alleged violations.

255
See Cain v. White, 937 F.3d 446, 450, 454 (5th Cir. 2019) (holding that
incarceration of debtors for unpaid court fees without consideration of their ability to pay violated due process); United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 1532,
1542 (2018) (suggesting that a challenge to a shackling policy should be alleged in
a civil rights action, not a criminal proceeding).
256
See 976 F.2d 673, 676 (11th Cir. 1992) (noting plaintiffs’ claim that local
indigent defense system violates the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments because
it “is inherently incapable of providing constitutionally adequate services”).
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1. Younger-type Claims
The overall test for applying Younger should follow what
courts and scholars have expressed for years: Younger should
bar a federal suit if the defendant has a remedy in their pending criminal case, but should not bar a claim that cannot be
vindicated in the pending state criminal proceeding.257 In
Younger, the plaintiff could raise his First Amendment challenge as a defense to the state court prosecution and eventually
on appeal to the Supreme Court, so the court rejected concerns
about chilling protected speech, reasoned that a state court
would be better positioned to narrowly construe a state statute
in light of local concerns, and specified that this claim was a
defense to prosecution.258 The court in Pugh v. Rainwater reasoned that Younger properly bars a federal lawsuit claiming a
Fourth Amendment violation because the defendant has the
exclusionary remedy in state court.259 Preserving Younger,
while interpreting it narrowly, is also consistent with Sprint.260
With this in mind, courts are likely to abstain under Younger
when litigants have a merits-based defense to prosecution in
state court.
But even for Younger-type claims, where a merits-based
defense is possible, the availability and adequacy of state-court
remedies should be examined carefully and not assumed. Enforcement of anti-homeless ordinances and the arrest of Black
Lives Matter protestors provide two examples of how a meritsbased defense in state court may fail to protect individual
rights. Anti-homeless ordinances can be challenged on the
merits under the Eighth Amendment or the Due Process
Clause.261 These laws, which typically criminalize sleeping or
camping in public, can lead to a range of criminal enforcement
actions including a warning, forced movement, destruction of
property, citation, arrest, booking, pretrial detention in the jail,
conviction, more jail time, fines, and other sanctions. Individuals may have a merits defense that is virtually impossible to
assert in criminal court: they may be subjected to enforcement
activity (a forced move, loss of property, arrest, or detention)
257
See Pugh v. Rainwater, 483 F.2d 778, 782 (5th Cir. 1973); Fallon, supra
note 15, at 1240; The Cases Dombrowski Forgot, supra note 5, at 667.
258
See 401 U.S. 37, 49–51 (1971).
259
See 483 F.2d at 782 (discussing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)).
260
See 571 U.S. 69, 77–78 (2013).
261
See Martin v. City of Boise, 920 F.3d 584, 604 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that
a local ordinance criminalizing outdoor sleeping violates the Eighth Amendment
when no alternative shelter is available and approving prospective injunctive
relief).
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without being charged,262 they are unlikely to be appointed
counsel, and their case may resolve quickly with a conviction or
dismissal at their first court appearance. Any of these circumstances could mean that there is no meaningful opportunity to
challenge their arrest or conviction. So, while a state court
remedy of dismissal exists, as in Younger, the practical difficulty (or impossibility) of challenging the prosecution on the
merits mimics the transitory features of the pretrial detention
claims in Gerstein and ODonnell. Litigating and aggregating
these claims in a civil-rights suit makes sense and plaintiffs
actually facing prosecution should not be disqualified from suing on the basis of a pending prosecution.263
Some Black Lives Matter protestors were stuck in a similar
kind of limbo, unable to challenge their arrest on the merits.
Many Las Vegas protestors who were arrested in Clark County,
Nevada in the summer of 2020 were ordered to return to court
on their citations only to be told the district attorney’s requested several more months to decide whether to prosecute.264 In the meantime, protestors did not know whether
their arrests—for such crimes as breaching the peace and failure to disperse––were lawful, could not challenge them in criminal court, and did not know if or how to lawfully protest.265
Could they sue in federal court to challenge the legality of the
statutes or their arrests? Traditionally, a federal district court
would abstain under a straightforward application of Younger,
262
See, e.g., Sara K. Rankin, Punishing Homelessness, 22 NEW CRIM. L. REV.
99, 113 (2019) (identifying noncriminal punishments, such as property loss, psychological and emotional harm, and loss of identification and benefits, that can
result from enforcement of anti-homeless ordinances).
263
See also Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 2692–93 (observing the vexing
problem of standing in criminal reform suits: “[a] person who is being prosecuted
in state court cannot, because of abstention doctrines, challenge the adequacy of
representation in a federal court action. But a person who is not a defendant is
unlikely to be able to meet the requirements for standing and ripeness.” (internal
citations omitted)).
264
See Ricardo Torres-Cortez, 80 Protesters Arrested, 12 Officers Injured in
George Floyd Demonstration on Strip, LAS VEGAS SUN (May 30, 2020, 12:14 AM),
https://m.lasvegassun.com/news/2020/may/30/george-floyd-protestersmarch-on-strip-for-justice/ [https://perma.cc/GF55-SGTT]; Dana Gentry, Right
to Protest Proves Costly in Las Vegas: Bail Voided for Strip Protesters, Not Downtown Activists, NEV. CURRENT (June 26, 2020, 5:55 AM), https://
www.nevadacurrent.com/2020/06/26/right-to-protest-proves-costly-in-lasvegas/ [https://perma.cc/G4AZ-Q5TH]; see, e.g., Case No. 20-CR-005318 (Las
Vegas J. Ct.) (showing prosecutor declined to prosecute a protestor more than
four months after arrest).
265
These questions are similar to those in Younger, which required dismissal
because the plaintiff was actually facing state prosecution, and Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974), in which the Court held that declaratory relief was
available to plaintiffs not facing prosecution.
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which presented similar issues and dismissed concerns about
chilling political speech.266 The protestors could assert standing based on the threat of subsequent arrest,267 argue that
there was no pending criminal proceeding (because charges
had not been filed),268 and request only declaratory relief (without seeking to enjoin any prosecution).269 These arguments
would require the federal court to carefully parse Younger in
deciding whether there was a pending prosecution or an adequate remedy in the state criminal court for the protestors to
promptly vindicate their rights.
2. Systemic Challenges
The third major category of claims are systemic claims like
those challenging state indigent defense systems.270 Over the
past decade, plaintiffs have successfully claimed that underfunded, overburdened indigent defense systems violate the
Sixth Amendment because they constructively deny individuals the right to the effective assistance of counsel.271 This novel
claim has primarily evolved in state court due to the risk of
Younger abstention in federal court under the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Luckey v. Miller nearly three decades ago.272
266
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 50 (1971) (acknowledging that inhibiting
full exercise of the First Amendment “should not by itself justify federal
intervention”).
267
See Steffel, 415 U.S. at 459.
268
See Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 213 (2008) (holding that a
criminal judicial proceeding starts at a criminal defendant’s initial appearance
before a judicial officer).
269
FILL IN FOOTNOTE.
270
Smith, supra note 5, 2343–45 (describing criteria for systemic harms).
271
See, e.g., Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1123–24
(W.D. Wash. 2013) (finding inadequate funding and denial of counsel at critical
stages of criminal proceedings systematically deprived indigent defendants the
assistance of counsel); Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217, 224–25 (N.Y.
2010) (recognizing a claim of constructive denial of counsel based on alleged
deficiencies in indigent defense system); State v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592, 597
(Mo. 2012) (en banc) (recognizing that high public defender caseloads may violate
Sixth Amendment right to effective and competent counsel); Pub. Def., Eleventh
Jud. Cir. of Fla. v. State, 115 So. 3d 261, 270 (Fla. 2013) (acknowledging that
public defenders’ excessive caseloads render them unable to provide constitutionally adequate representation); Kuren v. Luzerne County, 146 A.3d 715, 717–18
(Pa. 2016) (holding that a class of indigent criminal defendants alleged a valid
cause of action for systemic denial of counsel due to underfunding and could seek
an injunction forcing a county to adequately fund a public defenders’ office);
Duncan v. State, 774 N.W.2d 89, 97–98 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that
plaintiffs can sue state officials and seek injunctive relief for systemic denial of
counsel due to lack of adequate funding and oversight), aff’d on other grounds
mem., 780 N.W.2d 843 (Mich. 2010).
272
See 976 F.2d 673, 673–74 (11th Cir. 1992) (affirming dismissal based on
Younger abstention of class action challenging adequacy of Georgia’s indigent
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In Luckey, the plaintiffs did not seek to enjoin a prosecution
and argued unsuccessfully that Gerstein, not Younger, controlled. The problem, the court explained, was not a pending
state prosecution but the breadth of their challenge.273 As the
Eleventh Circuit reiterated with approval in Walker, the plaintiffs in Luckey “intend to restrain every indigent prosecution
and contest every indigent conviction until the systemic improvements they seek are in place.”274 The court in Walker
analogized such “pervasive federal court supervision of State
criminal proceedings” to the kind of “intrusive and unworkable” relief requested in O’Shea.275
These claims should not be barred under Younger abstention based merely on their scope and impact. In fact, some
federal courts are deciding indigent defense claims. In Wilbur
v. City of Mount Vernon, which the local defendants removed to
federal court, the court found a Sixth Amendment violation and
imposed injunctive relief, including a part-time monitor to
track, evaluate, and report on public defender performance,
and ordered defendants to pay attorneys’ fees and costs.276
This claim could not have been brought within a criminal case:
criminal defendants cannot aggregate their claims to challenge
policy issues or secure prospective injunctive relief, and no
single defendant could vindicate this Sixth Amendment claim
within their state criminal case. Instead, a federal court should
process the claim like any other, by ruling on justiciability
issues, resolving motions to dismiss, making factual findings,
and ruling on the merits.277 A constructive denial of counsel
claim, courts have held, imposes on plaintiffs a “weighty” standard of proof, requiring allegations of “systematic deficiencies”
defense system under Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments); see also
Drinan, supra note 2, at 468 (“[T]o date, a federal forum has not been available to
indigent defendants seeking to vindicate their Sixth Amendment right to counsel
on a systemic basis.”); Rodger Citron, Note, (Un)Luckey v. Miller: The Case for a
Structural Injunction to Improve Indigent Defense Services, 101 YALE L.J. 481,
501–02 (1991) (arguing in favor of structural injunctions to reform indigent defense systems and urging state courts to issue guidelines governing the provision
of indigent defense services).
273
See Luckey, 976 F.2d at 679 (noting that the requested injunctive relief
would be “significant” and “inevitably set up the precise basis for future intervention condemned in O’Shea”).
274
901 F.3d 1245, 1255 (11th Cir. 2018).
275
See id.
276
989 F. Supp. 2d at 1123, 1133–37; see also Wilbur v. City of Mount
Vernon, No. C11-1100RSL, 2014 WL 11961980, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 15, 2014)
(awarding plaintiffs over $2 million in attorney fees, plus costs).
277
See Kuren v. Luzerne Cty., 146 A.3d 715, 718 (Pa. 2016); Stephen F.
Hanlon, The Appropriate Legal Standard Required to Prevail in a Systemic Challenge to an Indigent Defense System, 61 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 625, 638–39 (2017).
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and “substantial structural limitations” on the right to counsel
and a “likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury.”278 If plaintiffs with standing state a valid claim under
that demanding standard, their claims should be heard and
the need for and scope of relief should be decided later based
on the facts and constitutional violations.
C. Structuring Adequate Remedies
Decreased reliance on Younger abstention raises remedial
questions for courts and litigants. The limitation on remedies
flows from courts’ reticence, both institutional and federalismbased, to impose injunctive relief in state court. Even without
Younger abstention as a barrier, federal courts may adhere to
the policy of noninterference, limit the scope of the federal
rights, and restrict injunctive relief in state court. Caution
about federal injunctive relief in state court propelled the creation of Younger abstention, so it makes sense that courts will
exercise extreme care in cases that actually reach the remedial
stage.279 Federal courts can take steps to secure constitutional
protections for state criminal defendants while minimizing federal interference and oversight. These include carefully managing or staying the case, providing declaratory relief,
approving state court enforcement procedures that do not require federal oversight, and scaffolding federal enforcement
measures if hands-off remedies prove insufficient to protect
individuals. The reticence of federal courts to grant injunctive
relief in state courts may cause plaintiffs to opt to sue in state
court instead.
Time is a powerful tool that federal courts can deploy to
obviate the need for injunctive relief or justify it. In a case
challenging a state criminal statute, the defendants will argue
that the constitutional issue can be resolved in the pending
criminal prosecution. In a case challenging state criminal procedures, local officials may claim that policy reform efforts will
resolve the alleged constitutional violations.280 In either situation, a federal court could stay the case, instead of abstaining,
278

Kuren, 146 A.3d at 744–45.
See Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 44, at 264.
280
See, e.g., Pugh v. Rainwater, 332 F. Supp. 1107, 1109 (S.D. Fla. 1971)
(discussing local reform efforts); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 108 (1975)
(discussing local reforms); ODonnell v. Harris County, 227 F. Supp. 3d 706, 736
(S.D. Tex. 2016) (discussing local reform efforts), aff’d in part, rev’d in part 892
F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2018).
279
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to await further developments.281 In ODonnell, the district
court stated that “[c]areful case management . . . not abstention” would allow the court to hear the case and consider any
policy updates.282 In Gerstein, the district and appellate courts
reviewed the claims in light of numerous policy changes. Waiting for reforms or redress can serve two useful purposes: it can
obviate the need for federal intervention if the violations are
resolved or redressed, or it can help justify the need for federal
intervention if local reforms or remedies are inadequate to protect the defendants’ rights.283
Another option is to adopt state-court enforcement mechanisms as a term of federal relief in order to postpone or eliminate the need for federal interference.284 In Gerstein and
Walker, for example, the federal courts required local officials
to develop an implementation plan subject to federal approval.285 This empowered local authorities to structure compliance in a way that is feasible and sensitive to their
institutions, which they best understand. Local enforcement
mechanisms can directly benefit criminal defendants in their
individual cases without federal court involvement. The district court in ODonnell attempted to do exactly this by enforcing
the state’s forty-eight-hour detention rule and requiring that
poor defendants be released in “the same time frame” as those
who are able to post bail.286 The Fifth Circuit rejected both
terms, however, as not constitutionally required, adding
“[s]ome wealth-based detention is permissible.”287 The Fifth
Circuit’s strong rebuke of the lower court on this point signaled
that at least some courts would curtail remedial measures in
the state court.
Scaffolding federal intervention can help to sequence and
graduate enforcement: if the local authorities adequately prevent or enforce remedies for constitutional violations, no federal interference is required. But if they fail to comply with the
plan, federal intervention may be justified. In Caliste v. Cantrell, for example, the plaintiffs claimed that a local judge violated due process because he managed fee revenue for the
281
Prospective Relief, supra note 5, at 237–38 (examining options to stay the
pending state criminal or federal civil rights case).
282
227 F. Supp. 3d at 737.
283
See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 108–09.
284
See ODonnell v. Goodhart, 900 F.3d 220, 222–23 (5th Cir. 2018).
285
See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 108; Walker v. City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245,
1253 (11th Cir. 2018).
286
900 F.3d at 222.
287
Id. at 225.
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court while also determining ability to pay and setting bail for
pretrial detainees.288 The defendant entered a consent decree
in which he “agreed to amend his bail practice to consider an
arrestee’s finances before setting bail and whether nonfinancial
conditions of release are available.”289 Six months later, the
plaintiffs asked the federal court to hold the defendant in contempt based on several transcripts that showed that he had
violated the consent decree.290 Though the district court
granted the plaintiffs’ post judgment discovery request to access more hearing transcripts, it denied the contempt motion
stating, “a finding of contempt would be premature until more
conclusive evidence emerges.”291 This cautious approach
shows that even with a consent decree in place, federal courts
may exercise restraint and prefer a graduated approach.
Finally, the prospect of limited injunctive relief in federal
court may steer some litigants back to state court where they
may be more likely to secure sweeping, enforceable reforms. In
California and Nevada, for example, civil rights organizations
partnered with public defenders’ offices to challenge pretrial
detention policies in state criminal cases and related habeas
actions.292 In both cases, the state appellate courts required
the lower courts to consider ability to pay and nonfinancial
alternatives to detention; impose detention only upon a showing by “clear and convincing evidence that no less restrictive
alternative will” secure the defendant’s presence or public
safety; and make record findings on the basis for detention.293
This relief, anchored in the expansive right to bail provisions
under state law, strictly limits wealth-based detention and fa-

288
No. 17-6197, 2020 WL 814860, at *1-2 (E.D. La. Feb. 19, 2020) (detailing
the Fifth Circuit’s decision affirming that a local judge’s “dual role” of determining
bail and overseeing bail revenues violated due process, citing Caliste v. Cantrell,
937 F.3d 525 (5th Cir. 2019)).
289
Id. at *2.
290
Id. (“Plaintiffs allege that [the d]efendant continues to impose secured
money bail on defendants who cannot afford it without first considering the adequacy of nonfinancial conditions of release.” (internal quotations omitted)).
291
Id. at *5.
292
See In re Humphrey, 228 Cal. Rptr. 3d 513, 515, 545 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018)
(remanding for a new bail hearing to consider defendant’s ability to pay or nonfinancial conditions of bail), aff’d, 482 P.3d 1008 (Cal. 2021); Valdez-Jimenez v.
Eighth Judicial District, 460 P.3d 976, 980 (Nev. 2020) (en banc).
293
In re Humphrey, 228 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 545; Riley Snyder, Nevada Supreme
Court Orders Significant Limits on Cash Bail, NEV. INDEP. (Apr. 9, 2020, 2:44 PM),
https://thenevadaindependent.com/article/nevada-supreme-court-orders-significant-limits-on-cash-bail [https://perma.cc/NNL5-LTRW] (citing ValdezJimenez, 460 P.3d).

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\106-7\CRN703.txt

2021]

unknown

Seq: 59

DISTRIBUTED FEDERALISM

8-DEC-21

17:08

1817

cilitates meaningful judicial review.294 Unlike in federal court,
these state courts could formulate bold, direct action to eliminate wealth-based pretrial detention. In Humphrey, the court
acknowledged that it was imposing new obligations on local
court officials “already burdened by limited resources,” which
were necessary “to correct a deformity in our criminal justice
system that close observers have long considered a blight on
the system.”295 This language contrasts sharply with the cautious reluctance among many federal courts to impose injunctive relief on already burdened state courts.
As Younger abstention recedes, federal plaintiffs will continue to confront federalism as a barrier to securing injunctive
relief to redress constitutional violations in state court. This
limitation on federal relief will cause litigants to seek negotiated
solutions that more fully and effectively redress constitutional
violations than a federal court may be willing to impose by
order. Some litigants may decide that state courts are more
promising venue for justice reform.
CONCLUSION
Courts and litigants are revisiting the scope of Younger and
engaging in a new conversation about the role of federal courts
in enforcing constitutional rights in state criminal proceedings.
For decades when state criminal defendants complained of injustices, Younger required federal courts to look the other way.
Times have changed. Today state criminal justice systems are
vastly expanded, harsher, more rushed, and mostly unsupervised by state or federal courts. This high-volume, highpressure, high-stakes atmosphere, which drives nearly all defendants to plead guilty, makes it difficult for any defendant
promptly and effectively to vindicate their constitutional rights
in a state criminal case especially if they lack counsel. The
Supreme Court has recognized that Younger abstention is the
exception, not the rule, and that civil-rights suits, particularly
class actions, are a proper vehicle for challenging the constitutionality of criminal policies.
Distributed federalism helps capture this transformation of
Younger and supports greater transparency, so that courts’
reliance on federalism is explained, justified, and reviewable.
Plaintiffs are discovering that federalism is shifting from a justiciability concern to a merits and remedial issue. While this is
294

See Valdez-Jimenez, 460 P.3d at 987; In re Humphrey, 228 Cal. Rptr. 3d at

545.
295

228 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 545.
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a major victory, many courts that reject Younger abstention
remain cautious about imposing new burdens on state courts
or overseeing compliance. A key battleground in this new terrain is whether federal courts can structure relief that will vindicate constitutional rights and withstand appellate scrutiny,
either by minimizing federal interference or sufficiently justifying federally mandated reforms. Until they do, plaintiffs must
carefully weigh whether to pursue state criminal justice reform
in federal court. Litigants also will test whether and to what
extent Younger will continue to block suits challenging the adequacy of indigent defense services and the constitutionality of
statutes enforced against the homeless or political protestors.
Addressing these questions openly, instead of turning a blind
eye to injustices, is an encouraging step forward.

